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Both Sides Could Lose in the Conflict in Ethiopia | በኢትዮጵያ በተፈጠረው ግጭት ሁለቱም ወገኖች ሊሸነፉ ይችላሉ

Posted by addisethiopia / አዲስ ኢትዮጵያ on February 3, 2022

👉 ገብርኤል 👉 ማርያም 👉ኡራኤል 👉 ጊዮርጊስ 👉 ተክለ ሐይማኖት 😇 ዮሴፍ 👉 መድኃኔ ዓለም

💭 My Note: A wonderful observation!

EXPERT OPINIONS: By Ivan Loshkarev

On a January day in 1900, Russian traveler and military officer Alexander Bulatovich was having a conversation with Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia, during which he laid out his thoughts concerning public governance, the army and defending Ethiopia’s northern and northwestern borders. Bulatovich expressed his thoughts in the blunt manner of a military man, making many openly critical remarks. Bulatovich eventually allowed himself one criticism too many, causing the emperor to exclaim: “Why are you telling me these frightening things? What kind of advice is that? Just give me some advice, and leave that aside.” “ETHIOPIA THROUGH RUSSIAN EYES” “Russia Needs To Embrace Ethiopia…Now!

This episode from the history of Ethiopia’s relations with the outside world is reminiscent of the current state of affairs. The conflict between Tigray national regional state (kilil) and the federal government continues unabated. The United States and Russia are calling on the parties to sit down and talk, citing the dire humanitarian consequences of the conflict. In its statement on the current situation, the UN Security Council also mentioned possible negative effects and risks, since the conflict directly or indirectly impacts Eritrea, Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia. However, the deafening calls by the leading powers and international organisations to strike a compromise (just like the “frightening things” above) remain unanswered by Tigray.

Everyone doubled down

The parties to the conflict were unmoved by the increase in external pressure, which was quite expected. The Tigray Defence Force (TDF) conducted major operations outside ​​the towns of Dese and Kombolcha in Amhara regional state, which were controlled by the Tigrayans from October 30 to December 6, 2021. Even though these towns are more than 400 kilometres away from Addis Ababa, the capital of the country, the strategic situation has changed dramatically. Much of Ethiopia’s overland export/import supply line passes through Dese and is part of the direct route to Djibouti. Although the road leading to the capital has an alternate route, the Mille-Awash highway, as a result of operations that have been carried out, the Tigray Defence Forces (the military wing of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front) managed to significantly limit the federal government’s ability to bring in foreign currency, not to mention the necessary imported supplies.

The strategic situation has changed not only because of the takeover of these two towns, but also the imminent defeat of a significant portion of the federal forces and militia from southern and eastern regional states. On October 6, 2021, the federal authorities announced the start of the “last offensive” on Tigray. We know now that it failed. Instead of its “final retreat,” the Tigray Defence Force announced the formation of a political alliance with other ethnic rebel organisations (primarily the Oromo Liberation Front). On November 4, in an interview with the BBC, member of the Central Committee of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) Getachew Reda upped the stake considerably when he said they are not interested in taking the capital, though

Faced with these setbacks, the federal government introduced, on November 2, a six-month state of emergency. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took to social media to accuse the TPLF and its new allies of destroying the country and seeking to repeat the mistakes of Libya and Syria. Meanwhile, his posts on Facebook and Telegram revealed that he understands the complexity of the situation: “It would be foolish to expect the army which is all alone (without the active support of society – author’s note) to declare victory.” Clearly, for several days the federal government was at a loss of what to do next, limiting itself to thorny philippics against the TPLF and calls for more victims in the name of victory. In the following weeks, soldiers and officers were called up by the Ethiopian National Defence Force – the federal authorities were able to stop the offensive from the north. But the very fact that the TDF is taking strong action in key areas shows that the previous strategy to contain the Tigray issue within certain geographical boundaries has failed, and the federal government has yet come up with a new strategy.

But despite this series of setbacks, it remains determined to destroy the TPLF and its allies. Federal media liberally use epithets like “rats,” “terrorists,” or “forces of destruction” to describe the federal government’s opponents. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s call to “stop, reverse and bury the terrorist TPLF”, which was deleted by Facebook, was widely covered by national and international media. The country’s government is still capable of doing this since it enjoys absolute air and troop superiority.

Ghosts of 1991

After several defeats suffered by the federal government, many analysts recalled that in May 1991, the TPLF had already taken over Addis Ababa, which was also preceded by bloody clashes with the government. On the surface of it, the conflicts look similar: in the 1980s, the government of socialist Ethiopia bombed areas outside of its control, and the TPLF gradually liberated rural communities and recruited the war-weary rural poor into its ranks.

First, the TPFL enjoyed broad support among regional players, such as Somalia, Sudan and the Eritrean separatists. Political assistance was no less important than financial assistance and supplies. In 1991, the Eritrean and Sudanese leaders mediated contacts between the TPLF and the Oromo rebels in the first weeks of forming the new government in Ethiopia, when the sheer number of differences in the victors’ camp threatened to lead to a new round of clashes.

The current realities are starkly different, since Somalia and Sudan are preoccupied with internal problems and lack strong consolidated governments capable of taking any of the possible position on the conflict between Tigray and the federal government. Eritrea took the side of Addis Ababa, not the rebels, from day one of the conflict.

Second, in recent months, however, military luck has turned away from the Tigray Defence Force. Operation Sunrise failed in August 2021. Its goal was for the Tigray units to access Lake Tana (located to the west along the Weldiya-Wereta highway) and cut off direct transport links between the Amhara state and the central regions of the country. With great difficulty, the TDF units reached the town of Debre Tabor which is located 30-40 kilometres away from the final destination, but were then forced to retreat almost 100 kilometres to the east. The failure of Operation Sunrise had little to do with the federal troops’ actions. The expert resistance offered by the Amhara state security forces, the militias and youth brigades of the Amhara ethnic group was enough to get the job done.

Third, in 1991, the attitude towards the TPLF in Ethiopia was more neutral. Even though socialist Ethiopia’s state propaganda did quite a lot at that time to demonise this organisation, the population did not always trust information from official sources. Today, the TPLF is, in fact, a former ruling party, which has been leading the country towards a brighter future for 27 years.

A huge number of complaints against the TPLF have piled up over this period, especially in large cities in southern and southwestern Ethiopia. After Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, a new campaign to demonise the TPLF began, this time marked by broad-based social support.

Taken together, these factors make the federal government’s position more stable, despite military setbacks and greater diplomatic pressure from outside players.

Playing chicken?

Game theory offers a wonderful model called “chicken,” when players threaten to inflict maximum damage on each other until one eventually backs down. The point of “chicken” is to create extreme tension which causes one side to make a mistake. We can understand the situation in Ethiopia through this lens. On the one hand, the federal authorities have outlawed the TPLF, destroyed almost the entire business network operated by the Tigray party functionaries and are waging war with them to the bitter end. On the other hand, Tigray and its new allies are accusing its opponents of genocide, gradually cutting off the federal centre from international trade, and making statements about the need for a constitutional overhaul. Winning this game is possible only in the case of mutual concessions. Any other scenario will imminently lead to the defeat of one or both sides. Since the federal and Tigray governments are raising the stakes and rejecting compromise, only the worst-case scenarios remain on the table.

Three factors suggest that Tigray’s southward offensive is likely to fail.

First, the TPLF detachments are spread to the south from Tigrayan motorway towards the capital for tens of kilometres, which makes them extremely vulnerable to a possible attack from the west. Even if this attack is carried out by a contingent of the Amhara state security forces without the support of federal troops, it could stop the advance of the Tigray Defence Force and, provided favourable circumstances, cut off a significant portion of the units from the parent state in the north.

Second, the TPLF allies can be extremely unreliable. Among the nine organisations that formed the United Front of the Ethiopian Federalist and Confederalist Forces , there is no clear understanding of the ultimate goal of the confrontation – it can be either a transitional government or talks with the current government. Moreover, in addition to the TPLF, the new alliance includes the powerful Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which has a similarly long history of guerrilla warfare, including under TPLF rule.

In a bipolar structure like that, the ethnic organisations may well get distributed between two centres of gravity where political associations of the Agaw, Afar and Kemant ethnic groups will gravitate towards the TPLF, while those of the Somalis and Sidamas will gravitate towards the OLF. Given the uncertainty over goals, the emergence of dividing lines in a new anti-government alliance is all but unavoidable.

Third, resistance to TPLF operations will grow as they get closer to the densely populated highlands in central Ethiopia. One gets the impression that TDF is most effective in mountainous and rural areas, while operations within a radius of 200 kilometres from the capital will require completely different material and organisational resources that the Tigray forces simply do not possess yet.

There is a number reasons the federal government may fail. Following a series of resignations and dismissals of high-ranking supporters of the former regime, the military command of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces was essentially incapable of military planning, namely, to concentrate the forces and means necessary to eliminate clear threats, or to set and pursue several objectives at once. The current federal government’s situation is a direct outcome of failures in military planning, and prospects for improvement are slim, since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has no other staff to rely on.

The worsening socioeconomic situation in the country and weakening support for the current government are another reason. Amid the pandemic, GDP per capita dropped to 2014 levels, and inflation grew by 15 to 20 percent annually. [World Bank data. ]. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, droughts and locust infestations in eastern and southeastern Ethiopia in 2019-2021 put at least 12.9 million people on the brink of starvation, or, in UN terminology, “are expected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.” In addition, Ethiopia is home to 4 million internally displaced persons, concentrated in the country’s central and southwestern regions. Many forced migrants have been unable to return home for years now and remain in tent camps, upsetting the locals. Disturbances between them have been quite commonplace for a long time now. Add to that the numerous disagreements and clashes between ethnic groups, and it appears inevitable that the current federal government’s base of support will continue to shrink, making it harder to mobilise resources and maintain numerical supremacy over the Tigray Defenсe Force.

The loss of both sides after inflicting maximum damage on each other is the worst outcome in the “chicken” scenario. Since simultaneous mutual destruction is unlikely, developments in Ethiopia may unfold as follows. The land between the town of Weldiya and Debre Birhan will turn into a zone of instability with a patchwork of areas controlled by the TDF, OLF and forces loyal to Abiy Ahmed’s government (mainly from urban areas). This will create something of a buffer zone between direct parties to the conflict and keep it localised. However, local conflicts tend to spread, and that would aggravate numerous pockets of confrontation in the states of Afar, Somali, Oromia, and Benishangul-Gumuz. In the worst-case scenario, the federal government will be able to maintain effective control only over the central or even southwestern part of the state of Ethiopia.

An outcome in which both sides lose would set Ethiopia back decades in terms of socioeconomic development. Amid limited access to international trade and capital markets (with the route to Djibouti blocked, air travel and an unfinished transport corridor to the Berbera Port in Somaliland is what remains operational), the federal government will be forced to significantly reduce its social obligations and infrastructure plans. In its zone of control, the TPLF on its own will not be able to rebuild infrastructure and help the regions impacted by the war, droughts, and locust invasions.

In place of a conclusion

Based on the above, this much is clear.

First, the defeat of at least one party to the conflict (and worse yet, two) is fraught with serious political and economic consequences for the Horn of Africa’s largest country.
Second, the federal government and the Tigray authorities have so far continued to be uncompromising. In “chicken” game model, there is no pain-free way out. Much more perseverance, ingenuity and patience will be required from the international community and the African Union if they really want to influence the course of the conflict in Ethiopia. Space for compromise will have to be created where almost none existed prior. And this work cannot be postponed indefinitely.

More than a century ago, the Ethiopian emperor Menelik II turned away Bulatovich’s frank advice regarding war and territorial administration. But this does not mean that the emperor did not take similar ideas in. There was a Swiss man named Alfred Ilg at the Ethiopian court who was able to convey similar ideas in a softer and more convincing way. Perhaps all is not lost for Ethiopia today, either.



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In Ethiopia, Food is used by The Satanic Oromo Regime as a Weapon of War to Exterminate non-Oromos

Posted by addisethiopia / አዲስ ኢትዮጵያ on February 3, 2022

💭 Unprecedented Crises Trigger Severe Hunger in Southern Ethiopia

💭 My Note: The Oromo / Galla settlers have already exterminated 27 ancient Southern Ethiopian tribes

The current state of Ethiopia is fully under the control of the Oromos/Gallas. During the last five centuries the Oromo/Galla settlers have already exterminated 27 ancient Southern Ethiopian tribes. History is repeating itself, now, they have extended their genocidal Jihad towards Northern Ethiopia. The war in Tigray, and the systematic extermination of Southern Ethiopian tribes are part of the never ending Oromo expansion. The Oromos are an existential threat to all indigenous Ethiopians. The survival of the precious Omo valley tribes, like the Mursi, Hamar, Ari, Turkana, Dassanach, Nyangatom, Karo, Kwegu, Bodi, and Me’en. The Oromos have already armed these tribes so that they wipe us each other, now like what they did in Tigray, they are attempting to starve them to death. This must be a matter of great concern to us Ethiopians and the wider world.

New evidence from Oxford’s in-depth Young Lives survey:

· More than 40% of families in drought-affected region ran out of food in 2021

· One in three young people said they or their family went to sleep hungry

· 75% are worried about running out of food – a near 100% increase on 2020 figures

More than 4 out of 10 families living in communities across the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR) of Ethiopia ran out of food during 2021 because of severe drought exacerbated by high inflation, according to the latest survey from the long-running University of Oxford project Young Lives.

75% of families were concerned about running out of food…one in three young people said they, or other household members, went to sleep hungry because there was not enough food

In December 2021, Young Lives’ researchers interviewed 326 young people and their families from Ethiopia’s hard-hit south-western region. They found 75% of families were concerned about running out of food (see table below). And some one in three young people said they, or other household members, went to sleep hungry because there was not enough food.

Young Lives Director, Dr Catherine Porter says, ‘These alarming figures represent a staggering increase in food insecurity compared to when we contacted the same families at the end of 2020, before the drought set in.’

She adds, ‘Efforts to support those in need are already under tremendous strain, compounded by the ongoing conflict, notably in Tigray and continuing economic and social impacts of COVID-19, with services disrupted, insufficient social protection and a humanitarian system already overwhelmed.’

These alarming figures represent a staggering increase in food insecurity

Dr Catherine Porter, Young Lives Director

Dr Alula Pankhurst, Young Lives Country Director in Ethiopia adds, ‘We are deeply concerned for the vulnerable families who are part of our survey as they grapple with the immediate, unprecedented and devastating effects of climate change, conflict and COVID-19.

‘We are equally worried about the potential negative long-term impacts of severe malnutrition on children’s growing bodies and minds, as witnessed by our long-running study.’

UNICEF estimates almost 850,000 children are at risk of severe malnutrition in Ethiopia this year, with urgent humanitarian assistance needed for more than 6.8 million people by mid-2022.

Young Lives is a 20-year study following the same children across four countries, Ethiopia, India, Peru and Vietnam. The team in Ethiopia has been was unable to contact study participants in the entire region of Tigray and at sites in Amhara as communication is all but impossible in the north of the country because of the more than year-long conflict.

We are deeply concerned for the vulnerable families…as they grapple with the immediate, unprecedented and devastating effects of climate change, conflict and COVID-19

Dr Alula Pankhurst, Young Lives Country Director in Ethiopia

Findings from Young Lives’ unparalleled longitudinal research show early childhood stunting due to under-nutrition, especially amongst the poorest children, has a significant negative impact on the development of important cognitive skills, such as vocabulary and basic mathematics, as well as socio-emotional skills such as self-esteem, self-efficacy and agency, right through into adolescence. This impact may even occur during pregnancy or as a result of malnutrition experienced by adolescent girls even before they became pregnant, underlining the critical importance of targeting support to girls and young women.

Young Lives Surveys 2020, 2021

In late 2021, Young Lives contacted 326 study participants in the SNNPR region as part of the 4-country phone survey. On average, the households of our participants in the SNNP region comprise 9.9 people. So, because our food insecurity measures are based at the household level, around 3,227 people have potentially been affected.

We interviewed young people in 2020 and 2021 about food insecurity in the past year (so, during 2020 and 2021 respectively). This table gives rates and percentage increases in mild and severe food insecurity between 2020 and

The Young Lives team is currently analysing new data from an ongoing phone survey to investigate further deteriorating changes in food security, alongside impacts on the education, employment and mental health of young people. We will deliver our full findings in early March 2022.

Young Lives is a unique longitudinal study of poverty and inequality that has been following the lives of 12,000 children in Ethiopia, India (Andhra Pradesh and Telangana), Peru and Vietnam since 2001. The study is led by the University of Oxford and conducted in Ethiopia in partnership with Pankhurst Development and Research Consulting (PDRC), and the Policy Studies Institute (PSI).


💭 History repeats itself:

🔥 Amhara & Oromos bombing Tigray, Using Rape, Hunger & forced resettlement (Mengistu did it back then, Ahmed will do the same now) as a Weapon against People in Tigrayfor the past 130 years:-

😈 Menelik ll: Half Oromo + Half Amhara = Oromo (Crypto-Muslim / Man of the flesh)

😈 Haile Selassie: Half Oromo + Half Amhara = Oromo (Crypto-Muslim / Man of the flesh)

😈 Mengistu Hailemariam: Half Oromo + Half Amhara = Oromo (Crypto-Muslim / Man of the flesh)

😈 Abiy Ahmed Ali ´= Half Oromo + Half Amhara = Oromo (Crypto-Muslim / Man of the flesh)

[Galatians 5:19-21]

Now the deeds of the flesh are evident, which are: immorality, impurity, sensuality, idolatry, sorcery, enmities, strife, jealousy, outbursts of anger, disputes, dissensions, factions, envying, drunkenness, carousing, and things like these, of which I forewarn you, just as I have forewarned you, that those who practice such things will not inherit the kingdom of God.

🔥 Amhara & Oromos bombing Tigray, Using Rape, Hunger & Forced Resettlement (Mengistu did it back then, Abiy Ahmed is doing the same now) as a Weapon against People in Tigray for the past 130 years:-

👉 1. Menelik II. (1844 – 1913)

The Great Ethiopian Famine of 1888-1892

The great famine is estimated to have caused 3.5 million deaths. During Emperor Menelik’s Reign, Tigray’s split into two regions, one of which he sold to the Italians who later named it Eritrea. Only two months after the death of Emperor Yohaness lV , Menelik signed the Wuchale treaty of 2 May 1889 conceding Eritrea to the Italians. It was not only Eritrea that Menelik gave away, he also had a hand in letting Djibouti be part of the French protectorate when he agreed the border demarcation with the French in 1887. Some huge parts of Tigraywere put under Gonder. The Southern part, places like present day Alamata, Kobo etc were put under Wello Amhara administration.

👉 2. Haile Selassie (1892 – 1975)

In 1943, at the request of the Emperor Haile Selassie, the Royal British Airforce bombed two towns – Mekelle and Corbetta. Thousands of defenseless civilians lost their lives as a result of aerial bombardment. It is recorded that ‘on 14th October [1943] 54 bombs dropped in Mekelle, 6th October 14 bombs followed by another 16 bombs on 9thOctober in Hintalo, 7th/9th October 32 bombs in Corbetta’.

Between 2 and 5 million’ people died between 1958 and 1977 as a cumulative result. Haile Selassie, who was emperor at the time, refused to send any significant basic emergency food aid to the province of Tigray,

👉 3. Mengistu Hailemariam (1937 – )

1979 – 1985 + 1987

Due to organized government policies that deliberately multiplied the effects of the famine, around 1.2 million people died from this famine. Mengistu & his Children still alive & ‘well’ while Tigrayans starving again.

👉 4. Abiy Ahmed Ali (1976 – )

2018 – Until today: probably up to 500.000 already dead. 😠😠😠 😢😢😢 Unlike the past famine there is no natural or man-made drought, rather, Abiy simply uses war and hunger as a weapon. Abiy Ahmed sent his kids to America for safety, while bombing & starving Tigrayan kids!


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ጂሃድ በዘመነ ግራኝ አህመድ | በደቡብ ኢትዮጵያ ፲፩ የፕሮቴስታንት ቸርቾች በሙስሊሞች ተቃጠሉ

Posted by addisethiopia / አዲስ ኢትዮጵያ on March 4, 2019

በሻሸመኔ እና ሆሳዕና (ስሟ እስካሁን አልተቀየርም?) መካከል በምትገኛዋ በ ሀላባ ከተማ ነው ይህ አሳዛኝ ጂሃዳዊ ጥቃት የተፈጸመው። ገዠራ እና ዱላዎች የያዙ የመሀምድ አርበኞች “አላህ ስናክ ባር!“ እያሉ በመጮኽ ፕሮቴስታንቶቹን ለማጥቃት እንደ ዱር አራዊት ግር ብለው ሲሮጡ ቪዲዮው ላይ ይታያሉ። ይህ ጥቃት ቅድመ ዝግጅት የተደረገበትና በደንብ የተቀነባበረም እንደሆነ ታዛቢዎች ይናገራሉ። ከጥቃቱ ከሳምንት ቀደም ብሎ ሙስሊሞች በብዛት በሚኖሩባት በ ሀላባ ከተማ ብዛት ያላቸው ጂሃዲስቶች ልዩ ጉባኤ ማካሄዳቸው ተገልጧል። ፖሊሶችም በቸልተኝነታቸው የጥቃቱ ተባባሪዎች እንደሆኑ በተጨማሪ ተጠቁሟል።


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