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Posts Tagged ‘Red Sea’

Arab Muslim Smugglers “Deliberately Drowned” Up To 50 Ethiopian Migrants and Threw Another 180 Migrants into Yemen Sea

Posted by addisethiopia on August 10, 2017

A smuggler “deliberately drowned” up to 50 Somali and Ethiopian migrants in the sea off Yemen’s coast, the United Nations migration agency said.
The teenage migrants were trying to reach the Gulf countries via Yemen on Wednesday.
In a statement, the International Organization for Migration described the drownings in the Arabian Sea as “shocking and inhumane.”
“The survivors told our colleagues on the beach that the smuggler pushed them to the sea when he saw some ‘authority types’ near the coast,” said Laurent de Boeck, the Yemen mission chief for the International Organization for Migration.

Source

My Note:  The Almighty Egziabher is recording everything. R.I.P Brothers and Sisters!

My Note: These evils will pay the price soon, a very heavy price. What’s more tragic about this tragedy is, these evil Arabs are babysitted, aided and encouraged to execute their evil deeds by the Europeans. They won’t go so far without their help! I followed readers comments on the news about this tragedy over the net, 95% of the commentaries are disgusting. Many even cheer and celebrate the deaths of fellow human beings. Search and read it, very sad!

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Posted in Conspiracies, Ethiopia, Life | Tagged: , , , , , , , , | Leave a Comment »

The GCC Is Expanding To Eritrea, And It’s Not Good For Ethiopia

Posted by addisethiopia on May 22, 2017

Add to it the Qatari soldiers that have already been present on the ground for a few years to “mediate” the border dispute with Djibouti, and the most important members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have unexpectedly converged in what many might think to be among one of the most unlikeliest of places. While it may have been difficult to foresee this happening, in hindsight it actually makes quite a lot of sense, and contrary to the conventional assessment that this is about Yemen, the argument can be made that it’s also just as much about Ethiopia as well. Unbeknownst to many, Qatar is the “ox driving the cart” in this case, and whether they like it or not, the rest of the GCC states will be reluctantly forced to follow its destabilizing lead if Doha decides to throw Ethiopia into chaos.

The research expands on the briefing first laid out by South Frontand should be seen as a continuation of their original work. It begins by setting the context for what’s been going on along the Horn of Africa lately and how the GCC’s military advances fit into the larger context of recent history. The piece then investigates the levers of influence for how Qatar could destabilize Ethiopia as well as its radical ideological motivations for doing so. Finally, the article concludes with a scenario study of how Qatar could engineer an Unconventional War to bring down Africa’s next up-and-coming power.

The Crowded Coast

Geostrategy:

The Horn of Africa is one of the most geostrategic regions in the world due to its location along the Bab-el-Mandeb strait that connects the Gulf of Aden with the Red Sea. In a broader context, one can say that it’s one of two maritime chokepoints (the other being the Suez Canals) that link Europe with South, Southeast, and East Asia, and until the Northern Sea Route becomes operable sometime in the next decade, all sea-bound trade between the EU and these corners of Eurasia must transit through its narrow passage. As could be expected, this makes control over the strait a heightened prize for any power or combination thereof, and it’s not for naught that most Great Powers scrambled their navies to the region over the past decade ostensibly to “combat piracy”.

Come One, Come All:

What was really happening was that the US was trying to militarize the waterway under the auspices of countering “Somali pirates”, which it must be reminded, were bogeymen that were blown completely out of proportion by the Western mainstream media for premeditated geopolitical ends. The US wanted to create the conditions where the rest of the world would accept the continuous presence of its fleet operating in these strategic international waters, but precisely because their legal status, it meant that any other fleet could do the same thing on identical grounds, which is exactly what happened. While the UK and French navies were obviously there to support their American ‘big brother’, Russia, China, India, and Iran also sailed their ships there too, but for the purpose of both watching the West and symbolically showing that they won’t allow NATO to completely control this space.

The Strategic Illusion:

While the “pirate” hype has largely died down and the multilateral naval positioning over the Bab-el-Mandeb has markedly subsided since its frenzied height in the late 00s, the importance of the strait obviously hasn’t changed, and the American-initiated competition over its control merely took on another form and amphibiously migrated landward. The US joined its French partners in Djibouti by moving into Camp Lemonnier in 2001 (Paris never left the country after independence), thus giving it an on-land presence from which to project naval power if it chose to do so. It also opened up “anti-terror” facilities in Yemen during this time as well, but just like with the Djibouti base, these could also achieve the dual purpose of influencing the strait. With both of these power nodes already occupied by the US prior to the “anti-piracy race”, it might seem strange why America started such a game in the first place, but more than likely, it did so as a manifestation of the “exceptional” hubris of the Bush Administration that was also continued during the early reign of his successor.

Thus, while the non-NATO states may have felt they somehow lessened the US’ control over Bab-el-Mandeb by placing and then removing their navies from the Gul f of Aden, it was all just a carefully crafted illusion (one which hopefully resulted in the multipolar states acquiring some degree of useful information about the Western fleets). The US still retained its positions in Djibouti and Yemen, albeit without the ability to directly apply the same amount of force had its naval presence still been there in the same capacity, so nothing really changed in a simple strategic sense. That status of affairs would remain until the Yemeni Revolution finally succeeded in casting off the American- and Saudi-installed government in early 2015, which dramatically led to the US having to evacuate its military personnel from the country. For the first time since the end of the Cold War (when the Soviets had a naval base in Aden), the US didn’t’ fully control the Bab-el-Mandeb, and the strategic panic that this produced is partly why Saudi Arabia made the fateful and ill-planned decision to invade Yemen.

Bab-el-Mandeb And The War On Yemen:

The Saudis and their lackeys have succeeded in blockading the Yemeni coast and conquering Aden, thus returning most of the unipolar world’s control over their lost ‘real estate’ in this ultra-strategic region, but capitalizing on their unofficial casus belli to make sure that they can indefinitely retain control there, the GCC decided to ‘jump the pond’ to the Horn of Africa, hence its interactions with Eritrea and the contracting of Amara’s ‘services’. In a sense, Eritrea is envisioned as being the Gulf’s “back-up Yemen”, a friendly territory under its proxy influence from which punitive measures can be launched against the people of Yemen if they ever do succeed in once more nearly liberating the entirety of their country.

So long as Eritrea is under the GCC’s sway, then from a strategic-logistical standpoint, the Yemeni War of Independence will be all the much harder to win because the Saudis’ and their bloc have a ‘rear guard’ base almost directly abutting the country. The GCC’s actions in Eritrea can thus be seen as a type of “double insurance” in making sure that as many of the Yemenis remain under the Gulf boot for as long as possible, with such an unnecessary strategic consideration being seen as coming from a position of fear and weakness on their part, not strength. They fear the Yemeni militias so much that they’re preemptively creating this ‘rear guard’ supply and logistics facility in Eritrea “just in case” a counter-offensive one day manages to unsuspectingly cripple their occupying forces.

It’s appropriate at this juncture to take stock of all the international military forces currently present along the Horn of Africa. The Saudis and Emiratis now have a naval presence in Eritrea, and as South Front reported (and which was verified separately this summer), the UAE is also seeking to open a naval base in Berbera along the northern coast of Somalia in the breakaway Somaliland region. The US and France have an on-ground presence in Djibouti, but they’re also joined by the Japanese, which opened their first military base abroad since World War II in 2011 under the opportunistic ‘justification’ of “anti-piracy”. They might, however, soon be joined by China, if the rumors of Beijing eyeing the country for its first overseas base are true. China could of course call upon the convenient slogan of “anti-piracy” to justify any possible forthcoming presence, but no matter what its stated grounds for doing so are, such a base would serve the additional purpose of safeguarding the Chinese-financed Djibouti-Addis Ababa railroad to the fastest-growing economy in the world and the headquarter state of the African Union.

Gulf Interests Move Inland

Now’s a good time to elaborate more in-depth about the continental African interests that the Gulf States seek to pursue through their partnership with Eritrea. To be more specific, it’s better to look closely at Qatar’s geopolitical objectives in this case, since the tiny emirate ironically leads the regional pack in its preexisting involvement in East Africa.

Eritrean Backgrounder:

This coastal state is one of the world’s newest, having gained its independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after fighting a three-decade-long war to achieve it. Peace came only after the government in Addis Ababa, at that time run by a military entity known as “The Derg”, was dissolved in 1987 and its leader Mengistu Haile Mariam was ousted in 1991 by a coalition of ethno-centric rebel groups. Due to the near-continuous fighting that took place on its territory, post-independence Eritrea was a wreck, but President Isais Afwerki helped to achieve stability and elevated living conditions, as attested to by journalist Andre Vltchek who visited a year ago. Nevertheless, the economy is in dire straits and Eritrea is largely isolated from the world community, partly due to the border disputes it has with all of its neighbors, and also because of successful Ethiopian lobbying against it. According to Ethiopia, Eritrea supports a variety of anti-government rebel groups and even has links to Al Shabaab in Somalia.

The Qatari Connection:

The last point is extremely contentious and has never fully been proven, although to clarify a bit, a Wikileaked US diplomatic cable quoted the Somalian President accusing Qatar in 2009 of using Eritrea as a financial conduit for Al Shabaab. Considering Doha’s support to other terrorist groups such as ISIL, this doesn’t seem implausible, and it might even be that rerouted Qatari funds channeled through Eritrea (which might have received a modest cut) could be to blame for why Ethiopia would allege that its nemesis was aiding terrorists.

No matter what shape it takes, Eritrea’s direct or indirect links to Al Shabaab are one of the reasons why the UNSC initiated an arms embargo on the country in 2009 that was just renewed last month. In this connection it’s relevant to remind one of Qatar’s role in the region, and it’s that it was asked to deploy “peacekeepers” along the Eritrean-Djibouti border by each of their governments in 2010 to assist in “mediating” their border dispute. One can cynically suggest that this provided nothing more than the perfect cover for Qatar to continue supporting Al Shabaab, which as was mentioned above, it had already been doing for some time. The reason Qatar supports this terrorist group is because it’s basically a regional franchise of ISIL, and a faction of Al Shabaab had just pledged allegiance to its Arab “brothers” late last month. These two groups pursue the same radical Islamic goals that Qatar has been patronizing for years through its sponsorship of the Muslim Brotherhood, and ISIL and Al Shabaab are pretty much the more visibly militant and globally notorious arm of the Brotherhood in this respect.

The Afro-Eurasian Caliphate:

To get a fuller grasp of why Qatar is promoting terrorism in East Africa, one should understand the macro-regional context of Doha’s ideological ambitions. The peninsular pipsqueak uses its financial largesse to flex power disproportionate to its tiny size, and it manifests this through support of a hodgepodge of ultra-extreme Islamic groups, all of which are classified as terrorists by Russia: the Muslim Brotherhood; the Taliban; ISIL in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Sinai; and Boko Haram. Each of these terrorist groups is active in a certain geographic area, with the only ‘missing link’ being the southern vector, ergo the ideological/militant ‘necessity’ of Al Shabaab. Altogether, these terrorist organizations represent the ‘foot soldiers’ of a transnational caliphate project that Qatar and its US ally would like to see expand all throughout the central pivot of Afro-Eurasia, the “Greater Middle East” of Central Asia, the ‘conventional’ Mideast, North Africa, and East Africa. While its current prospects of success have dramatically dimmed ever since Russia’s anti-terrorist intervention in Syria, it still remains possible for Qatar and the US to actualize some aspects of this grand strategy in certain corners of their operational theater, which in this context is the Horn of Africa.

Double-Sided Chaos:

The introduction of “managed chaos” to the region via the Qatari-supported Al Shabaab terrorist group serves two main purposes. The first one is to pressure Ethiopia, which the US may feel more inclined to do if the country moves more solidly in a pro-Chinese direction in the future, and the second is to perversely use the presence of Al Shabaab to deepen its security relationship with Ethiopia by being the arsonist-firefighter that creates a problem and then ‘helps resolve’ it afterwards. It’s useful to recall that the US contracted Ethiopia to invade Somalia in 2006 in order to destroy the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a precursor of Al Shabaab, which thus strengthened the partnership between the two. Also, by keeping Islamic terrorism alive in Somalia, to whatever extent it’s present at a given moment, the US can keep the ‘justification’ open for selectively intervening in the country with drone strikes or commando raids, thus entrenching its presence in the region and turning the criminal into the ‘cop’.

The Enemy Of My Enemy:

Rewinding the focus back to Eritrea, Asmara is passively tolerant of Qatar’s Al Shabaab patronage because it could supplement its grand strategic goal of destabilizing Ethiopia. To explain, Ethiopia has previously intervened in Somalia against Islamic terrorists before and subsequently occupied the country, and the idea that its forces could continue to do so again in the future, and thus be bunkered down in another potential quagmire and spread thin in critical (and rebellious-prone) interior regions, excites Eritrean strategists. Furthermore, as will be explained more fully in the third section, there’s the potential for Al Shabaab terrorists to become the “freedom fighter” figureheads for the Somali population in Ethiopia’s eastern provinces, formally the Somali Region but also known as Ogaden. Eritrea’s most important objective is to have ethno-centric regions inside of its former colonizer achieve independence in the same manner that it did – through prolonged and militant struggle against the central government – so that its rival can never be in a position to threaten it again (let alone exist in its current state). If the Somali region just so happens to be the spark needed to set the whole federal haystack alight, then so be it, as Asmara’s reckoning goes, whether its Qatari-supported terrorism that initiates the destructive domino effect that they expect or an indigenous ethno-centric uprising.

The Big Picture:

To bring everything together in a more simple understanding, Qatar has taken the lead in destabilizing the Horn of Africa out of ideological and unipolar-loyalty reasons, and it’s using its “legal” presence in Eritrea to facilitate this. The War on Yemen provided the other main GCC states of Saudi Arabia and the UAE with a ‘plausible justification’ for also ‘getting in on the action’, knowing just as well as Qatar does that Eritrea is a ‘double-hinged’ state that can be used to simultaneously project maritime and continental influence, with the latter case being against Ethiopia.

Concerning the GCC’s newest geopolitical target, it’s one of the world’s most promising emerging economies, and from a Gulf perspective, it could also be useful in satisfying their African-directed agricultural and construction-outsourcing needs. Placing their forces in Eritrea, Ethiopia’s arch-rival and hated foe, is designed to put pressure on the rising, albeit potentially unstable, continental power and thus make it more amenable to whatever their forthcoming grand interests may be. Also, by making Eritrea an integral part of their regional military architecture, the Gulf States are essentially declaring that any aggression against it would also endanger their own interests, thereby blanketing Asmara with a de-facto security guarantee and altering Addis Ababa’s perceived existing strategic balance of power (which it had earlier assumed was relatively even).

By itself and approached from a purely geopolitical standpoint, it’s theoretically possible for Saudi Arabia and the UAE to maintain this new status quo between Eritrea and Ethiopia (perhaps even exploit it and each of those two states to their own advantage if shrewd diplomacy is applied), but the presence of Qatar, the ‘loose cannon’, means that the entire arrangement is inherently unstable and subject to sudden change. Qatar has proven itself much more prone to impromptu outbursts of rhetorical rage than any of the other Gulf States, and its comparatively younger leader (only 35 years old) is much less versed in the art of statecraft than his peers. Being so hot-headed and already harboring an inferiority complex vis-à-vis his larger and more mature neighbors, Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani is inclined to give the full terrorist ‘go-ahead’ whenever he feels like it (or if he ‘thinks’ it would be of strategic use for him), meaning that a Qatari-sponsored Islamic destabilization of Ethiopia cannot at all be discounted, and must be astutely prepared for by the country’s authorities.

Towards The Unconventional War Scenario

GCC Support:

The final section of the research discusses the Unconventional War scenario that Qatar could help engineer alongside Eritrea and Al Shabaab (one of its ideological ‘children’, it could be argued) to throw Ethiopia into chaos. Once this process begins, Saudi Arabia and the UAE could be expected to assist Qatar and this scenario to some extent, knowing that Doha is much too tiny and inexperienced to ever fully control the larger developments that it helps to unleash (the “Arab Spring” Color Revolutions are a case in point), and they thus want to be in a position to gain as much self-benefit from what may turn out to be an irreversible course of events. Correspondingly, with these self-motivated interests in mind, they could act as force multipliers in their own way for advancing the chaos that Qatar created, thereby ushering in a chain reaction that could lend crucial and ultra-destructive force to the scenario that will be discussed.

Consequences:

The full consequences of Ethiopian chaos won’t be discussed in the scope of this article, but they can be assumed to have the risk of virally spreading through parts of the North and East African regions (since Ethiopia is of the latter but capable of influencing the former through its border with the rebellious Blue Nile state of Sudan), and would at the very least impact the country’s 95 million or so citizens to an undetermined extent (to say nothing of the transnational social implications). Also, with China’s economy becoming more dependent for growth on trade with Africa, any significant disruption in Ethiopia, Beijing’s prized partner nowadays, could directly ripple back to the East Asian giant and negatively affect it to a degree, all depending of course on the preexisting level of Chinese-Ethiopian trade. The higher that Ethiopia rises in terms of international significance (be it diplomatic, economic, military, etc.), the harder its fall could be and the further the aftershocks would travel across the globe, thus suggesting that the (US-advised) Qatari destabilization of Ethiopia could be timed to achieve maximum effect depending on its relationship to various actors (in this case, likely China) at the given moment.

Identity Cleavages:

The greatest and most imminent threat to Ethiopia lays in the sphere of ethno-separatism, the sentiment of which has continued to boil even after the Cold War-era civil war was brought to a close. Part of the reason for this is that Eritrea’s independence set a dangerous precedent for the militant representatives of the country’s disaffected ethnic groups, which it seems include just about every single one of them in some capacity or another (even the dominant Oromo and Amhara pluralities). The reason for this is that Ethiopia is a hyper-eclectic country with a wide array of identities within its federal structure, and in such a situation, it’s always difficult for any governing authority (let alone what some rebel groups allege is the present Tigrean-dominated one) to strike the perfect balance between each of them and leave everyone satisfied. This preexisting state of divisive affairs was utterly exacerbated by the Ethiopian Civil War that broke out against The Derg, where ethnic-affiliated rebel groups banded together in order to overthrow the central governing authority. The militant comradery that developed within each identity community as a result heightened the self-awareness that each of them felt about their differences and thus made a post-war federal structure the only realistic means of keeping the country together, especially after Eritrea’s successful secession in 1993.

The identity divide was so entrenched in Ethiopia after the civil war that the new federal units were formed around ethnic affiliation. Here’s a map of them as taken from Wikipedia:

The CIA World Factbook lists the ethnic proportions as being “Oromo 34.4%, Amhara (Amara) 27%, Somali (Somalie) 6.2%, Tigray (Tigrinya) 6.1%”, followed by a multitude of others that compose minimal percentages. Altogether, these four groups form a little less than three-quarters of Ethiopia’s population, mostly concentrated in a north-south belt stretching between Tigray, Amhara, western Oromia, and northeast Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region.

Adding another crucial demographic layer to Ethiopia is the percentage of Christians (Ethiopian Orthodox and Protestant) and Muslims in the country, which is 62% to 33.9%, respectively, or almost 2:1. The following map demonstrates the geographic divide over religion and shows how this has a distinct overlap with certain federal units:

Afar and Somalis are a very small minority of the population and by themselves cannot account for the 33.9% of Muslim adherents in Ethiopia, and as the above map indicates, many believers in this religion live intertwined with Christians in Oromia, the most populous region. By itself and with the absence of context, this isn’t anything particularly relevant to Ethiopia’s stability, but recalling how Qatar and its Saudi ally have been front and center in provoking a clash of civilizations through their support of Islamic terrorism, this demographic factor becomes perhaps one of the most important of all. Al Shabaab in Somalia is pretty much one of Qatar’s proxy creations, just as ISIL is, and its proximity and ethnic overlap with the Somali Region is a definite cause for concern.

Unconventional War:

The Basics

Taken together, a Qatari-orchestrated jihadist-separatist war emanating from the Somali Region could prove to be the catalyst that sets off a whole conflagration of nationwide conflict. This initial Unconventional War has a very real risk of occurring due to the doubly second-class status that Somalis feel they are afforded due to both their ethnicity and Muslim faith. Al Shabaab’s terrorist war in neighboring Somalia actually began as an Islamic-tinted national liberation movement in response to Ethiopia’s 2006 occupation, but it rapidly descended into the jihadist nightmare that lay at the core of its proponents’ true vision. Although it showed its true colors and most undoubtedly scared away many possible supporters that would have otherwise flocked to it for its originally marketed national liberation agenda, it still commands some indigenous support inside Somalia, thus raising the risk that it could also do the same amongst the Somali community in Ethiopia that might still consider itself occupied (or be led to think in such terms).

Carving Out The Caliphate

The concept here is that Qatar would use jihadism to radicalize separatist Somalis in getting them to become diehard supporters of the cause, holding out the carrot of a Greater Somalia if they’re successful. This irredentist dream would neatly overlap with Qatar’s own of creating a proxy caliphate in the Horn of Africa, but it also places limits on the primary geographic area of focus for its terrorist campaign. However, with the nature of terrorism inherently being that it knows no borders, it’s of course possible that attacks could take place in the densely populated and centrally positioned Oromia Region, which could have the effect of sharpening the Christian-Muslim divide in the area and prompting copy-cat and reprisal attacks. The destructive chain reaction that this might set off could only realistically be put to rest by a heavy-handed military response, albeit one which may scare investors right out of the country and lead to Western condemnation. In and of itself, whether or not the jihadist-separatist war succeeds in its stated goals, it would still accomplish what might have been the indirect (perhaps even actual) objective all along of weakening Ethiopia and possibly even China’s position in the continent depending on the degree of closeness and importance that Addis Ababa occupies for Beijing by that time (which is expected to be ever increasing).

Eritrea’s Strategy

Regardless of whether or not Qatar ever goes forward with the previously described scenario, that won’t in any way prevent Eritrea from continuing with its own, as it bases its national security on keeping the Ethiopian military distracted and divided through its support of ‘stand-alone’ and unified rebel movements so that it can’t ever solidly converge against the country. Eritrea would like to one day liberate the city of Badme that Ethiopia has refused to cede to its control after the Algiers Agreement ended their bloody and stalemated 1998-2000 war and a Hague border commission ruled that it’s Eritrean territory, and it might be using its support of various rebel groups as a means of pressuring Addis Ababa into acceding to its international legal obligation.

Eritrea’s Tactics

Asmara’s aspirations are to assist neighboring Tigray Region fighters in their quest for independence, mirroring Eritrea’s own, in order to create a buffer state that would insulate it from any future aggression from the rump Ethiopian state. At the same time, however, Eritrea also has ties with rebel groups operating deeper in the country, and if significant battlefield coordination can ever be maintained between Eritrea and the Oromo separatists (the ethnic group of which is the most populous and geographically central in the country), then it would go a very long way towards giving Asmara a lever with which it can trigger serious damage to Ethiopia’s national unity. Some Oromo might be attracted to the nationalist rhetoric coming from their militant-separatist counterparts that allege that the group is being exploited to support the minor peripheral ethnicities, and any visible “Tigrean-dominated government” crackdown on their civilian representatives might add credence to this belief. Eritrea might even ‘get lucky’ if the current tribal violence in South Sudan motivates a spillover effect into the neighboring Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Region (home to 45 different ethnic groups) or Gambela Region that ‘naturally’ creates the state-fragmenting process that it and Qatar and looking to achieve for their own respective ends.

Doha’s Double-Crossing

On a final note, concerning any strategic Eritrean-Qatari collaboration in a future destabilization campaign against Ethiopia, the potential exists for Doha to stab its ‘ally’ in the back if its jihadist campaign is ‘too successful’. Eritrea might ironically be even more susceptible than Ethiopia is to an Islamic terrorist campaign because it has a similar proportion of Muslims that are also living in a similar economically challenging environment, and thus, might be ripe for ideological-religious manipulation under the ‘proper circumstances’. Additionally, the Muslim Afar living in the east partially represent Eritrea’s version of Ethiopia’s ethno-religious identity overlap that the latter has with the Somali Muslims, thus potentially leading to the same type of strategic vulnerabilities in this scenario. This factor could also be used by Qatar to manipulate Eritrea and keep its leadership in check, just in case the improbable happens and for whatever reason it decides to turn its back on its new patron.

On the flip side of things, so long as Asmara remains a loyal client of the Emir (which doesn’t seem set to change since it desperately needs the money and diplomatic support), it shouldn’t have anything to worry about. Eritrea is also much smaller than Ethiopia in both demographic and geographic terms, so it’s a lot easier for the state to exercise supervisory control over what’s going on and nip the jihadist process right in the bud before it fully blooms. However, as chaotic processes always prove themselves to be time after time again, once the genie is let out of the bottle, it’s impossible to stuff it back in, and even if Qatar doesn’t plan for it to happen, the jihad it unleashes in Ethiopia could also infect Eritrea in no time.

Concluding Thoughts

While it may not seem like it at first, the GCC’s military-logistical move into Eritrea is predicated just as much on influencing Ethiopia as it is about dominating Yemen. The Saudis and Emiratis may have just recently incorporated Eritrea into their coalition framework, but Qatar has been cultivating close ties with Asmara for the past 5 years as part of its “mediation” role in resolving the Djibouti border dispute, which incidentally saw it deploy 200 troops to the country. This means that the Muslim Brotherhood-espousing state is in a position to project its ideology throughout the region and intensify cooperation with its Al Shabaab proxy in nearby Somalia. The Saudis and Emiratis may initially be adverse to Qatar ‘rocking the boat’ in the region until after they’ve already tapped all of its economic benefit (which could take decades), but given Doha’s emotional- and ideological-driven foreign policy, it might do just that because it senses a ‘good opportunity’ here or there for furthering its self-interested geopolitical project.

In such circumstances, the GCC wouldn’t be able to indefinitely hold out the threat of Islamic-inspired terrorist destabilization as a means of blackmailing the world’s fastest-growing economy and one of Africa’s up-and-coming powers, but would have to reluctantly join in the Qatari-initiated unrest so as to secure whatever benefits they can while there’s still the ‘opportunity’ to do so. The ethnic, social, and religious cleavages already prevalent (and even overlapping in some cases) in Ethiopia provide more than enough domestic ‘gunpowder’ for a strategically placed spark to set the whole powder keg aflame, with the only fail-safe solution being for Addis Ababa to overwhelmingly respond with military force. Such a reaction might predictably scare away the investors that are needed to keep the ‘Ethiopian miracle’ alive, and the combination of capital outflow plus military suppression (no matter how justified it may seem) might further exacerbate the domestic differences in the country and place them in a perpetual process of worsening, up to the point of the country approaching the geopolitical abyss of dissolution along preexisting ethnic-federative lines.

Any disruption of Ethiopia’s stability could also be used as an indirect means of attacking Chinese interests in Africa, since Beijing has invested billions in helping the country rise and is expected to become increasingly dependent on its African economic partnerships in order to sustain its own growth at home. Large-scale unrest in Ethiopia could thus offset China’s plans for cooperating with the country on a high-level strategic basis, and it would thus lose not only a crucial marketplace for its goods or an attractive investment destination, but also its place in influencing the African Union right at its headquartered source in Addis Ababa. Therefore, many layers of intrigue blanket the possibility that Qatar may lead the GCC into a proxy confrontation with Ethiopia, be it out of its own regard or acting on behalf of American ‘advice’, which could see the Gulf using the country of Eritrea alongside Al Shabaab jihadists to dislodge China from its most important foothold in Africa.

Source

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Posted in Conspiracies, Ethiopia, Faith | Tagged: , , , , , , , | Leave a Comment »

The Destabilizations In Djibouti And Ethiopia Are Being Exploited Against China

Posted by addisethiopia on December 7, 2016

December 2016: An improvised fake Arab drama:

Saudi plans to open a military base in the tiny Red Sea state of Djibouti have raised concerns among Egyptian officials 

“Cairo is totally against the deal because it considers Djibouti to be under the Egyptian sphere of influence and because its location is important for national security,” an Egyptian diplomatic source, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, told The New Arab.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi Met With Eritrean Leader ‘to Pressure Addis Ababa’

Somali Refugees Arriving in U.S. at Highest Rate Ever in First Two Months of FY 2017

December 2015: A very good analysis of the gradual encirclement and targeted destabilization of Ethiopia

EthioEnemies

The northeastern reaches of the African continent have been maligned in the Western imagination as a place of dire suffering, war, and famine, but somewhat surprisingly, the region had remained relatively stable over the past decade, barring of course a few exceptions. All of that now seems ready to be reversed, however, with destabilizing events returning as the regional norm. Whereas the previous ten years of moderate stability and growth can be attributed to China’s positive involvement in the Horn, the forthcoming years of uncertainty are directly linked to the US and Saudi Arabia’s efforts to dislodge China from the region and bring it closer to the unipolar fold. As a result, it can objectively be proclaimed that the New Cold War between the unipolar and multipolar blocs has officially penetrated this part of Africa.

This briefing isn’t structured to be an in-depth report on the region and its historical development and intra-regional relations, but rather a run-down of what’s happening in the Horn of Africa and why. For that reason, it shouldn’t be taken to be absolutely comprehensive in its scope, and forthcoming research might be necessary to shed light on a few of its political-strategic nuances. The purpose is simply to bring attention to the latest developments in this part of the world and explain how they relate to one of the New Cold War’s objectives in ‘containing China’.

Here’s what’s been transpiring lately in each of the Horn of Africa states, with additional analysis about how this relates to the larger proxy struggle that’s presently being waged:

Sudan

This country used to be mostly independent in its foreign policy dealings and has historically been a victim of the US’ covert subterfuge, but in recent years, the government has drifted ever closer to Saudi Arabia, one of the US’ prime Lead From Behind proxies and Sudan’s maritime neighbor across the Red Sea. To condense a few decades of history into a short summary, Sudan has faced numerous CIA-sponsored insurgencies throughout the decades due to its rich natural resource wealth, with the two most notable being the ones fought in South Sudan and Darfur. After the former’s US-overseen succession, the separatist sentiment migrated across the new frontier and has now infected South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, while low-intensify violence continues to occasionally plague Darfur. As a result of Khartoum’s handling of the Darfur Separatist War, President Omar al-Bashir has been accused of war crimes and is subject to ICC arrest, although numerous states continue to flaunt the Western-controlled court’s politically motivated order. The US has also placed the country on the State Department’s “state sponsors of terrorism” list in order to enact sanctions and up the asymmetrical pressure against its legitimate government.

South Sudan’s secession in 2011 deprived Sudan of the oil wealth on which it previously used to rely, giving it power only over the transit routes through which the resource must pass in order to reach its Red Sea export terminals. In a short period of time, the two states predictably emerged at odds with another over this arrangement, thus inflicting mutually disadvantageous economic pain on each of them (and much to the US’ divide-and-rule benefit). Crippled even further by the monumental drop in oil prices over the past year, Sudan has been forced into a precarious pecuniary position that’s compelled its government to backtrack on its formerly multipolar policies and fall under the guiding sway of Saudi Arabia. For example, the New York Times revealed in 2013 that Sudan was actively participating as a covert weapons conduit to Syrian-based terrorists, and in early 2015 it joined the Saudis’ War on Yemen in exchange for $2.2 billion. In mid-December, it also jumped on the bandwagon and became party to Riyadh’s “anti-terrorist” coalition.

Being so chummy with the unipolar world’s most notorious Mideast proxy, it’s little wonder then that Sudan’s director of the National Intelligence and Security Services has oddly taken to bragging about his organization’s positive relationship with the CIA. Sudan has been geopolitically, economically, and ‘judiciously’ (in terms of the US-influenced ICC warrant) abused to such an extent by the US that its leadership has developed a form of Stockholm Syndrome and is now groveling at the feet of its oppressors. It believes that blindly currying favor with Saudi Arabia, it’s new patron (and in such a role only because the US’ economic war against it has placed it in a situation so desperate so as to make it receptive to Riyadh’s outreaches [note: this is an explanation not an excuse]), will somehow translate into a lessening of the US’ asymmetrical war against it and reprieve it of the unwarranted punishment that it’s been undergoing. Little does Sudan realize, however, that the chief reason for its latest woes has been because the US wants to pressure it to renege on its strategic cooperation with China and submit wholly to the Saudis’ Wahhabist authority instead. The US won’t stop until Chinese influence is totally ejected from the country and replaced by its Saudi counterparts, and even then, there’s no guarantee that it’ll abstain from supporting future separatist wars if it believes the geostrategic dividends to be worth it.

Eritrea

The author published a long-running analysis on this country’s unexpected relationship with the GCC and the consequences that it could have for Ethiopia, and it’s kindly requested that the reader reference this for full details. As an abridged summary, Eritrea’s economic desolation and international ‘isolation’ (it’s sanctioned by the UNSC for its supposed support of Al Shabaab terrorists in Somalia) have put it in an unenviable position that’s made its leadership eager to clinch partnerships wherever possible, even with the Saudis and their GCC ilk. For this reason, Eritrea is hosting a UAE naval facility and allowing its airspace (and some reports even say, 400 of its own troops as well) to be used in the War on Yemen, completely reversing whatever accolades it was previously given for taking a strong stand against ‘imperialism’. Of extraordinarily relevant note, Eritrea is also engaged in a heated rivalry with its former ruler Ethiopia, and this tense dynamic continually holds out the threat of spilling over into armed violence in the future. With Eritrea now under the GCC’s protective wing, Asmara might feel emboldened to provoke Ethiopia in the context of the unresolved Badme village dispute (the cause of the bloody 1998-2000 war).

Djibouti

marrioThis tiny former French colony is one of the most strategic naval outposts in the world, playing host to American, French, and Japanese bases, with a Chinese facility slated to join it in the near future. It’s also the only reliable access point for interacting with the burgeoning Ethiopian market, predicted to be one of the world’s fastest growing economies in the future. To facilitate Ethiopia’s development, China, one of the country’s most prized strategic partners, is building a railroad from Djibouti to the capital of Addis Ababa. This transnational connective infrastructure project could rightly be termed the “Horn of Africa Silk Road” for the prosperity that it’s envisioned to bring to all of those who participate in it. Just as much as the Horn needs China’s regional Silk Road, so too does China need the Horn’s marketplace, since outbound investment is the main reason why the One Belt One Road global project was initiated in the first place. This corner of Africa (Ethiopia to be specific) is supposed to function as an integral destination for Chinese investment projects and real-sector economic interaction and will play a key role in China’s balanced growth in the future years to come. This strategic imperative makes Djibouti even more important to China than initially meets the eye, and considering this factor as well as China’s forthcoming base in the country, it’s somewhat expected that the US would try to destabilize the government there as a form of asymmetrical punishment.

Lo and behold, that’s exactly what’s been happening in Djibouti over the past week. A “religious celebration” (curiously with no other details about this event described) turned into an all-out anti-government riot during which over a dozen people were killed and a handful of “opposition” leaders arrested shortly thereafter. The US has made an effort to vocally condemn the government’s response to the crisis and urge it to release the jailed “opposition” leaders and “exercise restraint” ahead of a presidential election in April. For its part, the government blames the violence on people “who act from abroad” and want to “destabilize [the] nation and sow divisions”. Analyzing the coverage over what’s happened and taking into account the US’ history of regime change provocations, it seems very probable that a Wahhabist or Muslim Brotherhood gathering in the capital was to blame for the unrest, as no unipolar outlet dared to mention any other details about the “religious celebration” that sparked the whole conflagration (a tactic that’s usually employed when their own radical terrorist proxies are to blame). Also, Djibouti has earned the consternation of Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies for resisting their appeals to open a base there for use in the War on Yemen, ergo why they had to seek out Eritrea’s assistance instead. Qatar is also “monitoring” the Eritrean-Djiboutian border since 2010 as part of its UN responsibilities in mediating the 2008 crisis between the two, so it’s already within easy operational range of managing a Muslim Brotherhood uprising if it so chooses.

To make matters even more gripping, Djibouti for some reason decided to join the Saudis’ “anti-terrorist” coalition, but in hindsight, this might prove to be its leadership’s ultimate misstep. With the country at mercy of Riyadh’s definition of “terrorism”, any justifiable statements it makes about the “religious celebrators” being Wahhabi or Muslim Brotherhood terrorists will fall on deaf ears and be discredited by Djibouti’s own “anti-terrorist” coalition members. At the same time, the anti-government provocation that just took place might even form an eventual pretext for a unilateral Saudi-led “anti-terrorist” ‘intervention’ there in order to capture the country’s strategic infrastructure and misappropriate it from China (in accordance with the US’ wishes). Additionally, the upcoming April presidential election is a ‘trigger’ event for ‘justifying’ a Color Revolution and all of the resultant tangential destabilization that comes with it. The objective, naturally, is to overthrow long-serving President Ismail Omar Guelleh (in office sine 1999) and replace him with a pro-US/GCC puppet (a Djiboutian version of Yemen’s Hadi) or subserviate him into complying with the unipolar world’s anti-Chinese wishes.

Ethiopia

This millennia-old country’s strategic significance vis-à-vis China was already touched upon in the above subsection and is explored thoroughly in the earlier cited article about the GCC’s new relationship with Eritrea, but expanding on this a bit, it looks probable that Ethiopia could become a continental leader if it continues along its state-driven development trajectory. Addis Ababa has very close ties with Beijing, but at the same time, it’s also warming up to Washington, having hosted President Obama during his summer visit to the country earlier this year, the first-ever for a sitting US President. Ethiopia also invaded Somalia in 2006 to remove the Islamic Courts Union from power, thereby demonstrating that it had an overlap of military-strategic interest with the US, which also wanted the group overthrown, and didn’t shy away from doing its bidding. Nearly a decade later, China visibly has more influence over Ethiopia and it appears that this will remain a constant so long as the present government is able to maintain power, but therein lays the supreme structural vulnerability.

Simmering domestic discontent fueled by ethnic tension, NGOs, and foreign patrons is threatening to violently return the formerly war-torn country back to its fratricidal past. The Oromo ethnicity, the largest plurality in the country at around 35% of the population, has been fiercely protesting against the government’s plans to take and develop some of their land around the capital. Nearly 100 people have since been killed, with the government accusing the protesters of attacking police during their uncontrollable rioting around this contentious issue. The Oromo have vowed to continue their protests and the crisis is primed for rapid escalation in the coming weeks.

2016-09-21_184739The Huffington Post, generally known as the mouth piece for part of the US establishment’s hyper liberal-progressive ‘values-based’ policies, even ran an attack piece against Ethiopia earlier this week, thereby demonstrating that a strong level of social and psychological conditioning is underway in order to prepare the American public and others for a possibly prolonged destabilization. Foreign Policy also jumped in the mix and wrote its own anti-government piece about the protests, obviously motivated by the implicitly anti-Chinese consequences that this developing crisis could engender. It’s even conceivable that the ongoing revolt could evolve into an all-out anti-government insurgency that links up with other ethnic groups (most likely the Ogaden-based Somalis), tactically mirroring the Ethiopian Civil War that preceded it. The difference between then and now, however, would be that the insurgency wouldn’t be based in the northern part of the country, but the central-eastern portions of it, and might even involve Al Shabaab. Speaking of the latter, there’s also the chance that the jihadist factor could play a large role, too, and the bombing of an Addis Ababa mosque earlier this month might not be ‘coincidental’ when seen in the larger scope of events that have since been unleashed.

To revert back to the focus on the Oromo protests, the reason that they could be a trigger for a large-scale nationwide destabilization is because Ethiopia’s capital is completely surrounded by their ethnic-based state, and thus, any municipal expansion in one of Africa’s fastest-growing metropolises must inevitably encroach on their territory. By and large, this plausibly sounds like a legitimate enough reason to protest, but the finer details raise questions about the movement’s legality. The Ethiopian Constitution, agreed to after the civil war and which granted the main ethnic groups their constituent identity-based states, stipulates that private individuals don’t have any land rights and that it is the state’s responsibility to allocate territory as is seen fit. As controversial as this may sound to outsiders, one would do well to remember that this is the official law of the land and was agreed to by all of the victorious parties that emerged from the civil war. It wasn’t a problem at all until Western-sponsored NGOs came into the country and started politicizing the issue among the Oromo ethnicity, knowing full well that sooner or later the Constitution’s stipulation would have to be applied to their territory as the capital inevitably grew past its rigidly defined municipal boundaries.

Somalia

The last piece of the Horn of Africa puzzle to be involved in the latest bout of regional destabilization is Somalia. The UN has recognized that the country is no longer a failed state but a “recovering, fragile country”, though this has no impact whatsoever on the socio-political vulnerabilities that make the country susceptible to external destabilization. Al Shabaab continues to use the nation’s territory as a base for attacking Kenyan interests, and this has the potential to draw the East African state deeper into the “recovering, fragile country’s” domestic affairs under an anti-terrorist aegis. For example, Kenya responded to the latest failed terror attack against a busload of people by bombing targets in southern Somalia, which is sure to draw the ire of Al Shabaab and circuitously inspire more attacks.

The author doesn’t mean at all to condemn or criticize the Kenyan authorities for their action, but simply to draw attention to the fact that Al Shabaab is the perfect “Reverse Brzezinski” vehicle for tricking neighboring states into preplanned quagmires. Al Shabaab is closely linked with Qatar, and this fact has even been reported on by Western media outlets like the Washington Post. The author spoke at length about the connection between Qatar, Eritrea, and Al Shabaab in his earlier piece for Katehon about the GCC’s involvement in Eritrea, but the main idea was that Doha wants to use its terrorist proxies as a weapon against Ethiopia, and the group’s Somali ethnicity might be used to attract adherents of the “Greater Somalia” idea to engage in guerrilla warfare in the Somali-populated Ogaden region of Ethiopia.

To address the Kenyan connection, this country is being targeted by Al Shabaab and its US and Gulf sponsors because of its close infrastructure cooperation with China. Beijing is building a railroad (the “East African Silk Road”) that will connect the port of Mombasa with Nairobi and Uganda, thereby helping to tap into the resources (both natural and in terms of labor) that are present in Africa’s Great Lakes region. Along the northern coast of Kenya and closer to the Somali-populated formerly titled North Eastern Province (Kenya now has a plethora of counties in place of its previous provinces), China is investing almost half a billion dollars in Lamu Port as part of its strategy of engagement with the country. Somalia, therefore, occupies a very strategy position in destabilizing both of China’s regional Silk Road ambitions, and it shouldn’t be seen as a random event that the country signed on to the Saudis’ “anti-terrorist” coalition.

The Somali government is obviously against its territory being used by any sort of terrorist group and for whatever destabilizing ends they or their patrons may have in mind, but it’s so weak and near-powerless that it’s not in any realistic position to prevent this from happening regardless. The new federalization of the country, which is still being progressively institutionalized, doesn’t substantially cover the separatist and largely independent Puntland and Somaliland regions, and from the vantage point of the federal government in Mogadishu, the priority is in restoring the country’s territorial integrity first (now that an internationally recognized, albeit symbolic, ‘national’ government has been installed) and only then going against the terrorist groups active on its territory. Until that time arrives, and realistically speaking it will likely be a long way’s off in the future, then Somalia will continue to be the springboard for terrorist groups like Al Shabaab to continue carrying out their patrons’ orders in destabilizing Ethiopia and Kenya, all with the larger (if formally unstated) intent of fulfilling the US’ goal to ‘contain China’ and evict it from the region.

The Saudis’ “Anti-Terrorist” Coalition As Part Of The Encirclement Of Ethiopia

AngryMo

Everything that’s been described thus far has been a verifiable chronicle of the GCC using regional springboards (Eritrea and Somalia) and provocations (like in Djibouti) to further their implicit anti-Ethiopian goals. Even if that isn’t the immediate intent of their actions (though it convincingly does look to have played a guiding role), given these states’ junior status to the US unipolar hegemon, sooner or later they’ll be called to act on the geostrategic advantages that they’ve obtained in order to carry out Washington’s regime change agenda in destabilizing Ethiopia. As was argued throughout this piece, the whole reason for that is because the over 100 million people living in this Horn of Africa state are a critical marketplace that China absolutely must tap into in order to sustain its balanced growth in the coming decades and bring substance to its One Belt One Road strategy on the continent. Considering this, then the strategic situation looks increasingly dire for the China-Ethiopia Partnership, with the Gulf States having encircled most of the country through their official engagements with Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia in some capacity or another (be it the War on Yemen like with Eritrea, the “anti-terrorist” coalition like Somalia, or a hybrid of both such as in Sudan).

The geopolitics of the Horn of Africa are dramatically shifting, having always been a subject of out-of-regional rivalry for some time, but never to the degree that they presently are nowadays. The end of the Cold War brought about an end to the US-Soviet competition in the region and mostly gave the US the advantageous momentum needed to carry out its hegemonic designs there. The “War on Terror” concentrated America’s focus in the heart of the Mideast (Iraq), though with time and the Pentagon’s heel-dragging conventional retreat, this focus was progressively widened once more to include the “Greater Mideast”, which geographically includes a large part of the Horn of Africa, and taking aside the religious-‘civilizational’ inferences, unquestionably incorporates Ethiopia as well. The period between 2001 and 2015 was the strategic window of opportunity through which China entered the Horn of Africa and began swaying Sudan, Ethiopia, and Djibouti (to an extent) away from the unipolar umbrella and towards the multipolar vision, although it eventually proved to be ideologically (although not pragmatically) unsuccessful in the case of Sudan, which has now quite literally sold out to the Saudis. Be that as it is, China is clearly the chief economic actor in the region, although Saudi Arabia is now rushing to play catch-up by using its oil largesse (despite the presently low price and its steadily dwindling financial reserves) to buy new friends in this geostrategic region. Both Riyadh and Beijing understand quite rightly how important the Horn of Africa is, as this region of the world abuts the only maritime gateway between the EU and the Indian Ocean, and henceforth to Southeast and East Asia.

The Saudi-Chinese Cold War In The Horn Of Africa

Saudi Inroads:

Understood in the manner that it’s been argued to this point, the Horn of Africa is the newest battleground in the New Cold War, with a subsect competition, the Saudi-Chinese Cold War, being the driving factor behind the region’s forthcoming destabilization. The US is incapable of dedicating the required about of its time and resources towards carrying out the mission of blocking China in this geo-critical area, ergo why it has subcontracted these responsibilities to its Lead From Behind partners in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar Each of these has their own motivations for positioning themselves in such a way as to pressure Ethiopia at a future time, and this is being done despite the Saudis’ strategic agricultural cooperation with the country. In fact, it can even be argued that the Saudis are engaging in a ‘good cop, bad cop’ type of routine vis-à-vis Ethiopia with Qatar, since Doha has had rocky relations with Addis Ababa before, but Riyadh is officially in its good graces and was even invited by the Prime Minister to invest more in the country back in October. This is a clear sign that Ethiopia doesn’t quite recognize the danger that is developing around it or that it is trying to be diplomatically ‘polite’ to the point of publicly avoiding any antagonizing and unconstructive statements about the nearby hegemon (though it did warn the GCC against using their Eritrean port for anti-Ethiopian ends). As a matter of fact, Ethiopia needs capital investment from all sources, not just China, so in a pecuniary sense, it’s open to Gulf money so long as it’s depoliticized, and especially if this helps to mitigate any disruptive scenarios that might be planned against it by intertwining it and the investor state in a relationship of complex interdependence.

Normative Differences:

Before continuing, it’s insightful to describe a curious element of the identity dichotomy between the two rivals, Saudi Arabia and China. Saudi Arabia is a Wahhabist state driven by violent evangelizing principles, whereas China is officially an atheist state that pragmatically accommodates for the plurality of beliefs within it and has no atheistically proselytizing designs on its partners. Most of the countries in the Horn of Africa are Muslim, and even majority-Christian Ethiopia has a substantial Muslim minority, yet this religious factor seems not to play a determining role whatsoever in why Sudan and Djibouti started enhancing their cooperation with China. If anything, it proves that Samuel Huntington’s thesis about a “Clash of Civilizations” is a cursory surface assessment about demographic similarities between select partners but not an actual ‘law’ of international relations that can withstand the type of scrutiny currently being applied against it. Nothing in his writings explains why atheist China was the premier partner of Sharia-adhering Sudan for most of the 2000s, for example, but his thoughts do play a role in the current radicalization of religious elements in these majority-Muslim countries. Partly because of this, Ethiopia is predicted to feel even closer with China in the future (aside from all of the other reasons it has for this [strategic, economic, political, etc.]) because Beijing is ardently opposed to any form of religious extremism, especially those that eventually take the form of terrorism.

Hybrid War Threat:

That being said, as seen through a geopolitical-strategic prism, Saudi Arabia is obviously angling to position itself in as advantageous of a place as possible for pressuring Ethiopia in the future, and this is why Addis Ababa needs Beijing so much. Bridging the two partners is Djibouti, which to remind the reader, is about to play host to China’s first-ever foreign military base and is the terminal point for the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railroad that China is financing. It’s also no coincidence that “religious celebrations” (which can only be Muslim in this context since Djibouti is overwhelmingly a Muslim state) suddenly turned into violent anti-government riots just a few months prior to a presidential election that the US may be trying to sabotage. Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia are peripheral partners in the US/GCC plan for containing Ethiopia, and it looks like attention is now being placed on the geostrategic chokepoint of Djibouti, the narrow bottleneck connecting the Ethiopian economy with its Chinese counterparts.

It can’t be ruled out that the destabilization in Djibouti will find a way to become transnational, most likely through the exploitation of the Afar ethnicity (35% of the Djibouti population) and their neighboring communities in Eritrea and Ethiopia. The former has a small proportion of this demographic while the latter has an entire state dedicated to them, but altogether, they form a geographically wide ‘stateless nation’ that could potentially be riled up into action by radical imams and/or Western NGOs. The broadening of Djibouti’s destabilization to Afar minority groups in Eritrea and Ethiopia might prove to be the spark that’s needed to return the two rivals to the brink of a mutually disastrous war, whereby anti-Ethiopian Oromo and Somali elements could be called upon to assist in the struggle and open up a debilitating second front.

Concluding Thoughts

committeeof300-custom-size-700-800

The Horn of Africa has returned to capturing global headlines with domestic disturbances in Djibouti and Ethiopia seemingly popping out of nowhere. The truth, however, is much more complicated and nefarious, as preexisting and legitimate internal grievances stand to be exploited by foreign actors with their own self-interested geopolitical agendas. Sadly, as is typically the case in these situations, this state of affairs has already proven itself capable of leading to bloodshed and claiming people’s lives, unnecessarily and purposefully escalating what otherwise could have been low-intensify political engagements.

Everything that’s happening in these two countries can’t be separated from the international context in which they occurred, which is the US’ larger New Cold War against multipolar Great Powers like China, in the specific context of which it seeks to use Saudi Arabia and the GCC as the Lead From Behind designee for evicting Beijing from the Horn of Africa. It goes without saying that AFRICOM is playing a coordinating role in managing the GCC and NGO actions in this broad theater and most likely in these two specific instances, with Saudi Arabia being subcontracted responsibility for bringing Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia into the militant fold.

The Horn of Africa has historically laid at the crossroads of Africa and the Mideast, but as the world enters 2016, it has also found itself as the crossroads of unipolarity and multipolarity, destabilization and development, and the path that it takes is dependent on the course that the New Cold War’s latest proxy rivalry runs in the coming future.

Source

Woe to those who call evil good, and good evil…

Who put darkness for light, and light for darkness;

Woe to those who are wise in their own eyes..

[Isaiah 5:20-21]

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China Expands Presence in Djibouti, the Mouth of the Red Sea

Posted by addisethiopia on May 12, 2016

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The Chinese have struck a deal with the nation of Djibouti to build a military base in close proximity to a critical American military base on the Horn of Africa.

According to PRI, “since 2014, this small chunk of the Horn of Africa, little bigger than the state of New Jersey, has been the only place in the world where the warships of the two countries’ navies are moored alongside each other.”

The Chinese are the second country to cut a deal with Djibouti this year to create a military presence, joining Saudi Arabia, which made a similar agreement early this year. China has invested heavily in the area by pumping billions into Djibouti and neighboring Ethiopia. The new base will both protect their investments and give them increased military presence in one of the world’s most important trading routes.

The Chinese government earlier this year began funding a natural gas pipeline to the main port in Djibouti that Beijing will then export. The major agreement has led some to caution that the government of Djibouti may depend too heavily on Chinese credit to function; estimates show a possible increase in the national debt of nearly 20 percent for the nation by 2017.

China has been increasing its investments worldwide, particularly focusing in Africa on Djibouti and neighboring Ethiopia. The new base will both protect its investments and give increased military presence in one of the world’s most important trading routes. Africa is uniquely situated at the opening of the major shipping lanes of the world. The Suez Canal and the Red Sea are among those major shipping routes, connecting Africa and Europe with Asia.

In an interview with Breitbart News, Captain Pete O’Brien, a military expert with the London Center, explained that China wants to be the dominate power in Asia. To achieve this goal, it must control passage through the South China Sea and the shipping lanes that lead to it.

Captain O’Brien went on to explain the Theory of Sea Power, written by A.T. Mahan in 1890. For China to become the dominate power in Asia and eventually the world, it would not necessarily have to control land, but control the approaches to the land. In the case of the South China Sea, this would mean Singapore in the east and the Suez Canal and the Red Sea in the west. If it can control the flow of trade on both sides, it will hold quite a dominant position in not only Asia, but the world. A base in Djibouti would be pivotal to monitoring traffic in the sea.

The Chinese government is currently embroiled in an extensive territorial dispute in the South China Sea far west of Djibouti. China has declared everything within a self-proclaimed “nine-dash line” its exclusive territory, spanning waters within the borders of Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and the Philippines. It has developed military facilities in the Spratly and Paracel Islands, on artificial islands built on reefs largely considered to be international territory. The Philippines has filed a case at the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague requesting a verdict that plainly notes where the borders of China end. China has vowed to disregard any such verdict.

A robust presence in Djibouti, then, could help secure China’s control around waters far to the west of the South China Sea, while the militarization plan underway in the Spratly and Paracel Islands would help cement its presence in the east. The small island nation is situated between the south opening of the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, which in recent years has become the epicenter of regional and international conflict.

Secretary of State John Kerry visited Djibouti in mid-2015, highlighting for the Associated Press that “the mainly Sunni nation has become a critical part of U.S. foreign policy. With U.S. ground forces out of Yemen amid a civil war, Djibouti is a launching pad for drone attacks on al-Qaida and other extremist groups as well as a key transit point for Americans trying to get home.”

Source

This is one of the biggest secrets of the NWO. We are heading for a starve off because the world population has grown too large, and the sea is a major source of food. China sees how its control will be critical to survival.

 

The strategic attractions of Djibouti

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The Egziabher Lord Sends Them Out Warning Signals – But They Continue Troubling Ethiopia

Posted by addisethiopia on November 8, 2015

ARAB COALITION EXPANDS INTO THE HORN OF AFRICA

The Emirati Armed Forces has started to use actively the Eritrean ports. According to our information, at least, three landing craft belonging to the United Arab Emirates were docked in the port of Assab on September 16.

A diplomatic row between Djibouti and UAE took precedence of these developments. On 28 April the UAE consulate in Djibouti was closed after the altercation between Wahib Moussa Kalinleh, the commander of the Djibouti Air Force, and Ali Al Shihi, Vice Consul of the UAE. Indeed, it was the a formal reason of the departure of the Gulf Cooperation Council troops based on a plot of land that Djibouti had put at its disposal in Haramous in early April to set up its military base. Then Saudi Arabia and UAE redirected their efforts aimed to build a military base on Eritrea.

In turn Eritrea will likely seek to expand its relationships beyond the region in an attempt to break its isolation in the region. Djibouti and Ethiopia have been trying to turn it into a regional rogue state through the African Union. So, from Eritrea’s perspective, accepting Saudi and Emirati cash and resources would be a logical move. Indeed, Eritrea is ready to accept cash and resources from anybody who is ready to provide them.

There was a time when Eritrea supported Yemen’s Houthi fighters and functioned as a transshipment location for Iranian supplies heading to them. Thus, the Saudi and Emirati attempt to involve a new member state into their coalition has 3 goals.

First is to prevent contacts among Eritrea, Iran and Houthi. It will reduce Iran’s possibility to provide supplies to its allies in Yemen.

Second is to use the port of Assab as a local logistics hub, situated relatively close to the conflict. Given the distances that must be traveled over sea to get to Aden from Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates, the port of Assab is located at a vantage ground.

Third is Saudi Arabia will be able to turn Eritrea into a tool to destabilize the situation in Ethiopia. It’s possible through the monoethnic communities of Ogaden and Oromo controlled by Eritrea. The Ethiopian government is conducting a rough anti-Saudi politics and, de facto, destroying all pro-Saudi Islamist entities.

Alternatively, a recent U.N. report claimed that 400 Eritrean soldiers were deployed to Aden to support the Saudi-led coalition. The Emirati vessels in Assab could either transport the Eritrean troops or ferry equipment and supplies to the Eritrean troops already in Yemen. Assab is becoming a point on the Saudi-led coalition’s main supply route.

In any case, the Saudi and Emirati presence in Eritrea won’t be limited by the Yemeni conflict’s length. According to unconfirmed reports, the UAE took on lease Assab for 30 years. Separately, the UAE is seeking to take on lease a former naval base in Berbera in Somaliland. Thus, the Emirati activity in Eritea is a first step in a big plan to establish a naval base network at the Horn of Africa’s coast.

Source

Saudi Arabia, UAE Paying Eritrea to Back Yemen Fight, UN Says

Russian plane prevented from leaving Sanaa airport in Yemen

If ISIS Isn’t To Blame For The Russian Plane Crash In Sinai, Who Is?

Deadly Cyclone Megh roars toward Yemen

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Good-old Cinnamon (ቀረፋ) May Cut off Cancer’s Blood Supply

Posted by addisethiopia on November 7, 2012

Cinnamon, one of the most ancient spices in human history, appears to have unique cancer-stunting properties, researchers reported in the Dec. 7 issue of the journal Carcinogenesis. Scientists in City of Hope’s Department of Molecular Medicine showed that extracts of the spice may be able to block the growth of blood vessels, called angiogenesis, in tumors.

“We found that a water-based extract from cinnamon was a potent angiogenesis inhibitor,” said Wei Wen, Ph.D., assistant professor of molecular medicine and senior author on the study. Cinnamon comes from the bark of a small evergreen tree.

Continue reading…

Cinnamomum Cinnamon benefits:

  • Diarrhea
  • Nausea
  • Digestion
  • Weight loss
  • Menopause
  • Warms the body
  • Yeast infections
  • Circulation
  • Uterine hemorrhaging
  • Fungal infections

The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea

The Cinnamon Adventure

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Opone Somalia
Malao Somalia
Aksum Empire Ethiopia/Eritrea
Himyarite kingdom Yemen
Frankincense kingdom Hadramaut/Yemen
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Early Chera, Chola, etc India

 

 

Etymology:

Cyeneum = Cinnamon?

The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea or Periplus of the Red Sea (Greek: Περίπλους τὴς Ἐρυθράς Θαλάσσης, Latin: Periplus Maris Erythraei) is a Greco-Roman periplus, written in Greek, describing navigation and trading opportunities from Roman Egyptian ports like Berenice along the coast of the Red Sea, and others along Northeast Africa and the Indian subcontinent. The text has been ascribed to different dates between the 1st and 3rd centuries AD, but a mid-1st century date is now the most commonly accepted. Although the author is unknown, it is clearly a firsthand description by someone familiar with the area and is nearly unique in providing accurate insights into what the ancient world knew about the lands around the Indian Ocean.

Although Erythraean Sea (Greek: Ἐρυθρά Θάλασσα) literally means “Red Sea”, to the Greeks it included the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.

Opposite Mountain Island, on the mainland twenty stadia from shore, lies Adulis, a fair-sized village, from which there is a three-days’ journey to Coloe, an inland town and the first market for ivory. From that place to the city of the people called Auxumites there is a five days’ journey more; to that place all the ivory is brought from the country beyond the Nile through the district called Cyeneum, and thence to Adulis.

Full text of “The Periplus of the Erythræan sea; travel and trade in the Indian Ocean

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