👹 Ottoman – European Alliance – Protestantism And Islam
We saw this alliance (The Seven Heads of the Beast) in action:
☆ Against Armenian, Greek and Assyrian Orthodox Christians of Anatolia
☆ Against Orthodox Christians of Syria and Iraq
☆ Against Orthodox Christians of Egypt
☆ Against Orthodox Christians of India
☆ Against Orthodox Christians of Yugoslavia
☆ Against Orthodox Christians of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine
☆ Against Orthodox Christians of Ethiopia
💭 Church leaders in the Tigray region of Northern Ethiopia are pleading for help. “Monasteries and holy shrines have been destroyed,” they wrote in a desperate letter to the Patriarch of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. “Churches everywhere are burning. … The blood of priests and deacons continues to spill, monks and nuns are fleeing from a ‘rain of bullets.’”
🔥 2021 – The sneaky manipulative Oromo Daniel Bekele was awarded with the German-Afrika prize/award for hiding the Christian genocide – for successfully preventing Christian Ethiopians fleeing the violence in Tigray from crossing into Sudan – into the European Union.
In the middle ages, Christian Europeans were searching for Prester John in Ethiopia, while anti-christian Europeans and the Ottoman Turks for their spiritual allies across the Ethiopian Ocean aka Indian Ocean. In the 16th century They found the Gallas/Oromos and Somalis between Indonesia and Madagascar, moved them north – and settled them in the Horn of Africa. Since then Jihad has been waged again and again against non-Oromosandancient Christians of Ethiopia.
😈 Johann Ludwig Krapf = Father of the Galla-Oromos who named the Gallas „Oromo„
1839 — Protestant German Oromo mission / Begin of Protestant Jihad
Krapf constructed the idea of a unified country ‘Ormania’, as a new centre of Protestantism in analogy to ‘Germania’.
😈 The consequences: An Oromo mission/ Jihad begins with the help of anti-Christ Europe and Turkey.
😈 „Source for Eritrean History: From a Romantic Quest for ‘Ormania’ to the Establishment at the Erythraean Coast”
The Oromos/Gallas who are unfortunately now in power in Addis, are a nomadic and pastoral people, who 500 years ago were living in what is present day Kenya and Tanzania, were on the move looking for greener pastures for their cattle, which were the backbone of their economy. The Oromos, contrary to current popular belief, were not organized into a single unitary state, but were a fractured society of nomads organized into Gadas. Each Gada had a leader and operated according to the interests of the Gada and not as part of a bigger entity or an Oromo nation. Some of the Gadas moved Westward from present day Kenya, past Lake Victoria and ended up in what is now Rwanda and Burundi (they may have been the ancestors of the people currently known as the genocidal Hutus, who have very close cultural ties to the Oromos that live in present day Kenya and Ethiopia).
Those nomad Gadas that moved north into Ethiopia did so in staggered waves. According to the Portuguese, the Oromos first set foot in Ethiopia in the year 1522. But their advances were checked by the Ethiopians. Only after 10 years of destructive wars between Adal and Ethiopia, which weakened both nations, were the Oromos able to move deeper into Ethiopia and Adal unopposed. Some may not know this, but the reason that the Adals built the wall of Harrer, which still stands today, was to defend the capital from the advances of the Oromo. A very interesting point that I would like to make here is that, it was because of Gragn that the Oromos got what is now largely perceived as a derogatory name – Galla. From my understanding, when Gran realized that the Ethiopians were turning the tides of war against him, he needed allies quickly and approached the Oromo Gada that had settled closest to Adal, seeking a military alliance.
💭 “The Gallas had little to contribute to the Semitized civilization of Ethiopia; they possessed no significant material or intellectual culture, and their social organization differed considerably from that of the population among whom they settled. They were not only the cause of the depressed state into which the country now sank, but they helped to prolong a situation fromwhich even a physically and spiritually exhausted Ethiopia might otherwise have been able to recover far more quickly.”
➡ Edward Ullendorff – “The Ethiopians: An Introduction to Country and People.” Oxford University Press, 1960
😈 While Drag Queens, Pedophiles & Baby Murderers Cheer His Departure on June 30, 2022
According to the news story from churchleaders.com he didn’t do anything or threaten anyone, In fact they threatened him. What was his crime exactly ?
Seattle Street Preacher Assaulted at Pride Event, Abortion Rally; Arrested After Bible Thrown in Portable Toilet
✞ The street preacher Meinecke had the same message for the police who arrested him, saying, “Father, forgive them, for they don’t know what they’re doing.” Meinecke told ChurchLeaders that Seattle is in desperate need of hearing the gospel, arguing that the city has grown increasingly wicked in recent years.
❖❖❖[Proverbs 29:16]❖❖❖
“When the wicked thrive, so does sin, but the righteous will see their downfall.”
💭 The Parable of the Pharisee and the Tax Collector
❖❖❖ [Luke 18:9-14] ❖❖❖
“To some who were confident of their own righteousness and looked down on everyone else, Jesus told this parable: “Two men went up to the temple to pray, one a Pharisee and the other a tax collector. The Pharisee stood by himself and prayed: ‘God, I thank you that I am not like other people—robbers, evildoers, adulterers—or even like this tax collector.” I fast twice a week and give a tenth of all I get.’ “But the tax collector stood at a distance. He would not even look up to heaven, but beat his breast and said, ‘God, have mercy on me, a sinner.’ “I tell you that this man, rather than the other, went home justified before God. For all those who exalt themselves will be humbled, and those who humble themselves will be exalted.”
💭 Sunday June 26th 2022: Christian Preacher Hatun Tash Arrested at London’s Speakers Corner
✞ Sunday 25 July 2021: Christian preacher Hatun Tash attacked and stabbed multiple times by a man in a black Islamic robe at Speakers’ Corner in Hyde Park, London
✞Coptic Christian Priest Killed in Egypt. Islamic Violence Against Christians Continues
✞The Funeral prayers of the martyr Hegemon Arsanios Wadid
✞Murdered Egyptian Priest Faced Years of Persecution Prior to His Death
Egyptian Coptic priest Arsanious Wadid, who was killed late last week, reportedly faced years of persecution prior to his death. Father Wadid was stabbed several times in the neck by a currently unidentified assailant with unknown motives. The timing of his murder correlates with the Muslim season of Ramadan and the Christian Lenten season of Easter.
In 2000, Father Wadid worked to begin building a new church in Karmouz. Extremists confronted him, attacked his car, and threatened to kill him. They warned him to never return. When Father Wadid first entered the priesthood, he acquired a plot of land in Ragheb and Karmouz, local districts of Alexandria, and began building a church.
Later on in his ministry, the Coptic priest left his home to attend a sunrise mass. A group of extremists were waiting around his car with knives. They put the knives to his neck and ordered him to return home and not visit the church again to pray. Under the pressure of the extremists and to prevent bloodshed and the protection of his congregation waiting for him and the church, Father Wadid returned home that morning. Because it was an unofficial church, not abiding by Egypt’s law on buildings for non-Muslim worship, no action was taken in the aftermath of the incident.
Father Wadid is one of many Egyptian Christians who face persecution for their faith as the minority in the Muslim country. As a priest, he was well acquainted with the discrimination and persecution of his Christian community. His death sparks concern for subsequent attacks during a time of heightened religious tension and observance.
💭 “At least 28 killed in Islamist attack on South Sudanese Christian community,”
At least 28 people were killed and 57 houses burned down in an attack by Islamist extremists against the Christian community of Yith Pabol, Aweil East county, South Sudan, in early January.
Bishop Joseph Mamer Manot said on 6 January that “massive displacement has happened, and the humanitarian situation is alarming as food and other property have been burned down into ashes, leaving survivors with no shelters, no food and no safe drinking water”.
The incident is the latest example of attacks against South Sudanese Christians by Arab Muslims from the Republic of Sudan, along the disputed border between the two countries.
A similar attack the same week in nearby Miodol village left at least four dead, with three others missing and several houses destroyed.
The state security adviser, Joseph Akook Aleu, said Monday that the state government decided to close the road to Sudan because of the ongoing attacks and killing of civilians.
South Sudan is about 60% Christian, mostly Roman Catholic and Anglican. By grace of God and the blessings of His Beatitude Theodore II, the Pope and Patriarch of Alexandria and All Africa, Metropolitan Narkissos (Gammoh) of Nubia founded the first Orthodox Christian missionary center in South Sudan in 2015.
Posted by addisethiopia / አዲስ ኢትዮጵያ on November 8, 2021
In both cases, Ethiopia and Afghanistan, the speed of the collapse of government forces was (and is) remarkable. The reasons for this are complex, with differences between the two situations, along with some similarities.
👉 Two events stand out for me this year.
The first was on 18 June when I visited Mekelle, the capital of the Ethiopian province of Tigray. Ethiopian Airlines had resumed a scheduled flight service after the rebels of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) had retreated into the hills in the face of an invasion by the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) at midnight on 3/4 November 2020.
The war came after months of simmering tensions between the government of Prime Minister Ahmed Abiy and the TPLF, which refused to join his new Prosperity Party, a successor to the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which had ruled Ethiopia since the collapse of the Marxist Derg regime in 1991.
I took a (very) battered taxi around Mekelle, which had to be bump-started, the driver always positioning it carefully on a slope whenever we stopped. “No parts”, he said of the ancient Toyota, though no money was a more likely reason, given its state. The driver filled up from small bottles of petrol bought on the side of the road, two litres at a time, literally a hand-to-carburettor existence.
My meetings with the UN humanitarian office and the university done and dusted, and having successfully stayed out of the way of the ultra-aggressive ENDF patrols, I made my way back to the airport for the return to Addis. There I stopped at a small kiosk selling Tigrayan trinkets. Business had been “very slow”, said the assistant, “since the war”. Having bought something which I explained was for my daughters, he thrust two small wooden crucifixes into my hand. “These are for your children,” he insisted, “since you have been kind to me. Thank you.”
Prime Minister Abiy had declared the war against Tigray to be over on 28 November with the fall of Mekelle to his ENDF, working in conjunction with Amhara “special forces” militia and, though denied at the time, Eritrean troops.
Just 10 days after I was in Mekelle, the rebel Tigray Defence Force (TDF) retook the city and advanced across the Tigrayan borders into the Amhara and Afar regions. Since then, TDF military gains have increased in tempo from steady to rapid.
In spite of Abiy’s latest attempt to launch an offensive against the TDF this October, today the rebels are less than 350km from Addis Ababa, threatening to cut the capital’s trade lifeline with the port of Djibouti to its northeast. This led Abiy to declare the State of Emergency this week, calling on residents to take up arms to defend the city against the rebels’ advance which was, he said, “pushing the country to its demise”.
In early July, I was in the province of Bamiyan, Afghanistan. I went there to meet the governor and to film near the Buddha statues which were infamously blown up by the Taliban in 2001 after declaring that they were unacceptable “idols”. I was working in the Arg, the Presidency, as part of an attempt to determine a fast-track method for regional peace — an effort best summarised as “too little, too late”.
In Afghanistan, just the following month, the 400,000-strong armed forces and police collapsed in the face of a Taliban advance. Between 9 July, when we left Kabul, the Taliban’s control of districts was at 90 out of 398; by 16 August, all bar seven districts were under Taliban authority. By 31 August, it was all over; the US and its allies had left, and the Taliban was in charge.
In both cases, Ethiopia and Afghanistan, the speed of the collapse of government forces was (and is) remarkable. The reasons for this are complex, with differences between the two situations, along with some similarities.
In Afghanistan, despite the numbers of government forces, at least on paper, much of the fighting was done by a small number of special forces, around 10% of the total. A combination of their exhaustion, malign regional actors (if for different reasons) in both Iran and Pakistan, an inability to manage Afghan materiel resupply by air, and the suddenness of the US pullout (the nadir of which was the departure from Bagram Air Base in the middle of the night on 2 July without informing their Afghan allies), reinforced a self-fulfilling prophecy of collapse, as one district after another folded.
In the end, the Taliban won the psychological war as much as the military contest.
In Ethiopia, Abiy’s attempts to bolster his forces by employing Eritreans along with Amharic militia and, latterly, fresh recruits from among the youth and retired soldiers, have served to demonstrate his weakness while scarcely adding to his military capability. Addis Ababa’s military reliance on the national arch-enemy in Eritrea at critical moments has hardly elevated Abiy’s popularity. In Afghanistan, of course, the regime was dependent on external support in the US; when that went away, it collapsed, spectacularly.
The presence of the US also turned the struggle into a regional religious jihad. But the post-Taliban project after 2001 suffered from the strength of the pull of tribal and religious identities over Afghan nationalism.
Ethiopia has faced the same challenges, where internal peace has been rare and the history between different ethnic groups — the Oromo, Amhara, Somalis and Tigrayans among them — less a source of unity than division. One group’s national hero is another’s imperialist conqueror and land grabber.
While government efforts have endeavoured to promote the functioning of a central, federal state through state-led infrastructure and a growing economy, the absence of a national cause at least as coherent (or as existential) as that of the Tigrayans has indubitably shaped their political direction as much as their relative martial prowess. The cause of Ethiopian nationalism has not been helped by widespread inequalities along ethnic, urban-rural and religious lines, frictions heightened by social media. Economic contraction and rising unemployment haven’t helped, now over 29%, with inflation touching 27%.
While both countries have been brutalised by their experiences, the psychological war is also important. Abiy has lost this battle, just as President Ashraf Ghani did in Afghanistan. In the last major towns to fall, Kombolcha and Dessie, just 350km to the north of Addis Ababa, the ENDF gave up without a fight, getting into their (and other people’s) vehicles and fleeing south. This is partly because the TPLF has proven to be so much better at the media battle, but also because Abiy has not enjoyed a good relationship with the press, not least given the government’s tendency to turn the internet on and off to suit its ends, which has backfired badly. His increasingly belligerent rhetoric, which includes calling on citizens to“bury” the rebels, has undermined his credibility internationally, a perception worsened, ironically, by his award of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019.
For Ethiopia, as Afghanistan, the components of a negotiated peace include the realisation by the conflicting parties that they have more to gain by ending fighting than continuing with it, that the international community pushes them to the table, and method, timing and leadership.
Both countries have faced a restive region. Kabul’s problems related directly to Pakistan’s support of the Taliban and that was rooted in Islamabad’s relationship with India and with its own domestic tapestry inside Pakistan. Iran had its own interests, centring on the removal of the US at whatever cost.
Ethiopia is in the centre of a particularly difficult and increasingly complex region. Sudan has just suffered a military coup (again), where the military component of a joint government removed its civilian counterparts from power, a putsch supposedly supported, inter alia, by Egypt. Both allegedly support the TDF against Addis, not least given mutual fears about Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam on the Nile. Eritrea’s role is well known, in part because of historical enmities between the Tigrayans and President Isaias Afwerki in Asmara, while Ethiopian troops have reportedly used weapons supplied by China, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, among others, to strike Tigrayan targets.
And there is the question of leadership failures and frailties.
Ghani failed to consolidate his military forces and give them reason to keep fighting. Abiy has relied on increasingly belligerent rhetoric to inspire dramatic acts of heroism and bravery against the advancing TPLF, one so far unmatched by military training, discipline and, it seems, motivation.
In between bouts of intellectual pomposity, Ghani tried to get a peace process going, but was let down by his US allies, who made peace with the Taliban in Doha in February 2020 while excluding Kabul. Abiy has been far less willing, talking up war rather than peace, not least since any acceptance of a negotiation process would involve tacit acceptance of the status of the opposition, weakening his legitimacy and credibility as the government in place.
The role of the international community in Ethiopia is different, though the country receives more than $5-billion in annual aid. It is not overwhelmingly dependent, as Afghanistan was, on one external actor (in the US), or vulnerable to one malign neighbour (Pakistan). But this does not entirely discount the role to be played by outsiders in urging both parties to the negotiating table through a measure of carrot and stick, including sanctions, and in placing their weight behind African mediation efforts. For instance, if Abiy does not play ball, mention of the rescinding of his Nobel Peace Prize might help to focus his mind.
Abiy so far has lacked strategic nous, reacting to events rather than having a grand plan for peace. Like Ghani, he is a reluctant peacemaker, making concessions only under duress. Both leaders’ handling of the military has been chaotic and amateurish. Abiy’s ethnic profiling of Tigrayans in business, in airport queues and in carrying out atrocities has not only undermined his cause, but ensured deep-seated enmities.
It is said that competent people choose to have smart, challenging folk around them. The Arg became a notorious echo chamber of ideas, Ghani surrounding himself with kinsmen and acolytes, some of whom were notorious for seeking rent through government connections. From all accounts, Abiy lacks the feedback loops that make leaders sensitive to events and receptive to good ideas. But he does not lack for messianic certainty.
Still, it’s difficult to negotiate a peace settlement from a position of weakness, no matter the level of confidence on the part of leadership. This is a lesson for Abiy as much as it was for President Ghani.
A military stalemate in Ethiopia would now require a stiffening of ENDF resolve and a consolidation of forces hitherto unseen. But it would be necessary if a peace process is to take root, since victorious armies generally don’t see the point in making peace when they are advancing — as the Taliban showed.
The way forward for peace in Ethiopia has to centre, first, on acceptance of a ceasefire by all sides in exchange for various confidence-building measures including the restoration of humanitarian access and services such as banking and electricity to Tigray. Getting to this point, however, demands mediators being allowed to freely travel to Tigray to shop these suggestions, which until now Abiy has been reluctant to do, out of fear of undermining his own position.
Thereafter there is a need for a settlement. Whether this allows Abiy to remain in office is one key question, one that is increasingly unlikely given the brutality of the occupation of Tigray. Any deal will also have to involve Oromia opposition groups, which have linked up with the TDF. This has to entail opening further lines of communication with plausible Oromo intermediaries, some of whom are in jail. Thus, releasing political prisoners would be another confidence-building measure.
Finally, all this would have to be thrashed out at some sort of national dialogue, implicit in which is an acceptance by the government that it is prepared to accept and facilitate a peaceful handover. Most likely this would have to be based on a Tigrayan acceptance of a subordinate role that would leave the TPLF in control of Tigray itself, but without major strength in the federal government.
Such a peace process will depend on a coordinated international effort in getting behind an indigenous process, involvement that is willing to hold Ethiopian feet to the fire.
Ghani missed several opportunities to make peace with the Taliban. The most notable was after the 2019 national election, when he was elected with less than 10% of nearly ten million registered voters. If he had used that moment to reset national politics, and to form an inclusive government, how different things might have been.
Abiy, like Ghani, fears that negotiation means equivalence of the cause of the national government with the rebels. So far, his favoured approach to nation-building has only worsened the political crisis, in so doing never failing to miss an opportunity.
Like Ghani, Abiy risks making himself dispensable to the interests of peace.
“Coded microchips implanted in every person in the country would tie all of us into a master computer that could track anyone down at any moment, and plans for such a system are already under way whether you like it or not!”
ይቀጥልና…
“The tiny transmitters can be injected painlessly from a tiny gun in humans without them even knowing it through a nationwide vaccination program.”
በመጨረሻም፡
“All the government would have to do is make up something like the swine flu vaccine.”
Posted by addisethiopia / አዲስ ኢትዮጵያ on November 8, 2021
💭 As Taliban took over Afghanistan presidential palace after president Aschraf Ghani Ahmadsai has fled to Dubai – in Ethiopia, the Oromo Taliban CRIME MINISTER Abiy Ahmed will also soon be deposed by Tigrayan Zionists and forced to leave the Arat Kilo palace forever. This evil and monstrous war criminal will be brought to justice. His dream of creating an „Oromo Islamic Emirate„ will remain a dream.
The Taliban declared the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan from the Presidential Palace in Kabul.
Convicted rapist who was deported from US in 2017 is arrested at Washington’s Dulles International Airport after catching Ethiopian Airlines evacuation flight out of Kabul
Ghader Heydari, 47, boarded evacuee flight but was flagged by border officials
How he got on flight unclear because it’s ‘unlikely’ he had Special Immigrant Visa
Man whose name matches pleaded guilty to rape in Ada County, Idaho, in 2010 A convicted rapist who was deported from the US in 2017 has been arrested at Washington’s Dulles International Airport after catching Ethiopian Airlines evacuation flight out of Kabul.
Ghader Heydari, 47, boarded a flight for evacuees but was flagged by border officials upon arrival into Washington.
He was being held at the Caroline Detention Facility in Bowling Green, Virginia, according to DailyWire, after his criminal and immigration history was pointed that.
He was released in December 2015, according to state records, and was deported from the country in 2017.
When Heydari arrived in the US on the evacuation flight, officials tried to persuade him to cancel his request to enter but he appears to have refused.
The U.S. evacuated 13,400 people from Kabul last Thursday, taking the evacuees to bases in Qatar, Bahrain or Germany before they return to the states.
They flew 5,100 people out of Kabul on US military planes. Another 8,300 were saved by coalition flights. The total – 13,400 – was drastically less than the 19,000 rescued the previous day.
Senator Ted Cruz responded to the situation on Twitter, “Biden’s evacuation from Afghanistan has been chaos. He’s bringing TENS OF THOUSANDS of people into America without thorough vetting. We have a moral obligation to get Afghans who fought with us out of harm’s way. But all unvetted evacuees should be housed in safe 3rd countries.”
“Coded microchips implanted in every person in the country would tie all of us into a master computer that could track anyone down at any moment, and plans for such a system are already under way whether you like it or not!”
ይቀጥልና…
“The tiny transmitters can be injected painlessly from a tiny gun in humans without them even knowing it through a nationwide vaccination program.”
በመጨረሻም፡
“All the government would have to do is make up something like the swine flu vaccine.”
(27 Jun 1994) As the Tutsi-dominated rebel Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) intensified its drive to take control of Kigali on Monday (27/6), the Hutu-dominated government army was training more men to combat
(27 Jun 1994) As the Tutsi-dominated rebel Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) intensified its drive to take control of Kigali on Monday (27/6), the Hutu-dominated government army was training more men to combat.
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