Competing regional powers have quietly backed Abiy Ahmed in Ethiopia’s deadly conflict
👉 From The New Arab
The war that started in November 2020 as a conflict between the Ethiopian Federal Government and the Tigray Regional Government has turned the country into an arena where many regional and international powers are active.
Like a Pandora’s box suddenly opened, the conflict has borne many geopolitical surprises, but one of its most important ironies is the reported use of drones and weapons supplied by competing powers in the Middle East, who seem to have agreed on their support for Ethiopia’s government.
U A E, the first player
The United Arab Emirates (U A E) has intervened in the Ethiopian war since it began, with leaders from the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) accusing Abu Dhabi of targeting Tigray an forces in November 2020 with drones stationed at its Assab military base in Eritrea.
In the wake of the Ethiopian withdrawal in the face of the advancing Tigray an forces in the summer of 2021, an Emirati air bridge supporting the government was monitored. This comprised more than 90 flights between the two countries in the period between September and November 2021.
Satellite images identified Emirati drones at Harar Meda Airport in Ethiopia and at a military base in Deirdawa in the east of the country.
The U A E’s intervention was an extension of its strategy to build an allied political and security system across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, most notably following Who Tea gains around Bab al-Mandab at the beginning of Yemen’s conflict.
Abiy Ahmed’s election as Ethiopia’s prime minister in 2018 further accelerated an alliance between Addis Ababa and Abu Dhabi.
That same year, the U A E-sponsored Eritrean-Ethiopia peace agreement pledged to support the Ethiopian treasury with three billion dollars, and made huge investments in various sectors.
From this perspective, the possibility of the Tigray ans seizing power in Addis Ababa was a threat to these political arrangements, and Emirati investments, especially since the TPLF view Abu Dhabi with hostility after its role in their first defeat in November 2020.
Turkish drones in the Habesha sky.
The visit of the Ethiopian prime minister to Ankara in August 2021 represented a turning point in the relationship between the two countries, which had become estranged in parallel with the development of Ethiopian ties with the U A E-Saudi axis.
During the visit, a package of agreements was signed that included “military cooperation”. Indeed, according to the Turkish Defence Industries Corporation, the value of Turkish military exports to Ethiopia increased from just $234,000 in 2020 to nearly $95 million in 2021.
Although in July 2021 the Turkish embassy in Addis Ababa denied that it had supplied drones to Addis Ababa, reports alleged the participation of Bayraktar TB2 drones in military operations in Ethiopia’s conflict after Ahmed’s visit to Ankara, which were not denied by either side this time.
This development is an extension of the Turkish approach in the region described by Jason Moseley, a Research Associate at the African Studies Centre at Oxford University. “Turkey has adopted an interventionist attitude in the regional crisis, with the consequent rebalancing between soft and hard power in favor of the latter,” he wrote last year.
In fact, Turkey saw drone support for the Ethiopian government as a strategic gain, bolstering its reputation in the African military and security market after it had proven its success in an African war arena, with growing demand for this type of weapon.
Ankara’s participation also indicates that Turkish construction companies could make a significant contribution to the reconstruction of infrastructure in the areas destroyed by the war
Preventing Ethiopia from sliding into a civil war protects Ankara’s large investments inside the country and ensures that the ensuing chaos does not spread into neighbouring Somalia, the most important centre of Turkish influence in the African continent.
Additionally, Turkish support for the Ethiopian government appears to be a strategic necessity due to Ankara’s fears of the Tigray ans, who Ethiopia has accused of being supported by Egypt.
In this sense, Ankara’s ties with Ethiopia are related to the exchange of support between the two countries, which is taking place in the context of their conflict with Egypt.
Iran seeks an opportunity
In a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, on 7 December 2021, TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael accused Iran, along with the UAE and Turkey, of providing the Ethiopian army with weapons, including drones.
Prior to that, the US government had accused Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) of providing drones to Ethiopia, and on 29 October 2021, sanctions were issued by the US Treasury Department.
According to investigative websites, Iranian drones have been seen in Ethiopia and 15 flights from two airlines linked to the IRGC have been monitored from Iran to the Harar Meda military base in Ethiopia.
Both the Iranian and Ethiopian governments have not yet commented on these reports.
The sharp dispute between Ethiopia and the United States over the war in Tigray, and Washington’s continuous pressure on Ahmed’s government, who has framed the conflict as a colonial attack on Ethiopia’s unity, has apparently brought Tehran and Addis Ababa closer.
Iran sees the Ethiopian PM’s need for military equipment as an opportunity to expand its strategic presence in a country that is historically an ally of the United States and Israel.
This level of Iranian engagement demonstrates the importance of the Ethiopian arena for Tehran, and indicates Iran’s desire to enter the burgeoning military and security market in Africa.
However, the most important prize for Tehran is a return to Ethiopia, which is situated close to Yemen, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Horn of Africa, after losing its influence in recent years with allies Eritrea and Sudan following Emirati-Saudi pressure, and the fall of Omar al-Bashir’s regime in Khartoum after popular protests.
Ultimately, all three powers are trying to exploit a moment of Ethiopian weakness to create or consolidate their influence.
The weight and extent of their involvement are best indicated, perhaps, by consultations the US envoy to the Horn of Africa, which has historical influence in Ethiopia, has been having with Middle Eastern capitals to try to find a solution to the Ethiopian crisis.
💭 Can you see the similarities between the Soumela St.Mary Monastery and the Mariam Dengelat St. Mary Monastery of Tigray, Ethiopia? On November, 2020 more than 100 Orthodox Christians were massacred by Turkish-allied evil leader of Ethiopia.
➡ CNN Investigation of Massacre at Maryam Dengelat Church in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region
💭 The courtyard of Panagia Soumela Monastery was recently turned into a nightclub for an advertising video clip, causing outrage in the Orthodox world.
The controversial video clip, with a DJ playing loud electronic music in the courtyard of the historic monastery and people dancing, had many Orthodox Christians reacting in anger.
Many comments in social media speak of the desecration of the historic monastery as along with the music, church bells can be heard in the background.
Some even demanded explanations from Turkish authorities, as the historic monastery had essentially been turned into a nightclub.
Greece’s Foreign Ministry said, on Monday, images showing a band dancing to electronic music at the former Orthodox Christian Sumela Monastery in Turkey were “offensive” and “a desecration” of the monument, Reuters reports.
The Ministry called on Turkish authorities “to do their utmost to prevent such acts from being repeated” and to respect the site, a candidate for UNESCO’s list of world heritage sites.
“The recent images that were displayed on social media, in which a foreign band seems to be dancing disco in the area of the Historical Monastery of Panagia Soumela, are a desecration of this Monument,” it said.
Turkish officials were not immediately available for comment.
Founded in the 4th century, Sumela is a monastic complex built into a sheer cliff above the Black Sea forest in eastern Turkey. It was long ago stripped of its official religious status and operates as a museum administered by the Culture Ministry in Turkey.
Thousands of tourists and Orthodox Christian worshippers journey to the monastery annually.
In 2010, Turkish authorities allowed the first Orthodox liturgy since ethnic Greeks were expelled in 1923 as part of a population exchange between Greece and Turkey. In 2015, the Sumela Monastery was shut for restoration and re-opened to tourists in 2019.
A liturgy to mark the Feast Day of the Virgin Mary was allowed in 2020 and 2021.
“It is surprising that the permit was given to the band, as the Monastery of Panagia Soumela opens only for pilgrims,” the Greek Foreign Ministry said. “These images are offensive and add to a series of actions by the Turkish authorities against World Heritage Sites,” its statement said, without elaborating.
Greece and Turkey disagree on a range of issues from airspace to maritime zones in the eastern Mediterranean and ethnically split Cyprus.
Expressing an important value among the places you should go to in Trabzon, one of the most beautiful cities of the Black Sea, Sumela Monastery was built on steep cliffs in Altındere Village located within the borders of Maçka district of Trabzon. It is known by the name of “Mama Maria” among the people. Located approximately 300 meters above Altındere village, the Virgin Mary was built in accordance with the tradition of steep cliffs, forests, and caves, which are traditional monastery construction sites. The monastery, which was founded in reference to the Virgin Mary, took the name Sumela from the word molasses, which means black.
Etymology of the Name Sumela
It is understood that the name of Sumela comes from the word “molasses” meaning black, black darkness in the local language of the years when the monastery was built, and the name of the region is Oros Melas. The original name of the monastery is “Panagia Sou Melas”. In the Ottoman Empire records, the monastery takes place as “Su (o)Mela.
Posted by addisethiopia / አዲስ ኢትዮጵያ on December 7, 2021
💭 A terrible storm hits Antalya, Turkey – which is waging a NATO green-lighted Drone Jihad – unleashing war crimes against the two most ancient Christian nations of the world: Armenia and Ethiopia
If Ethiopia is indeed operating Iranian-made armed drones, that would represent a significant addition to the list of beneficiaries from Teheran’s burgeoning drone programme. So far, Iran is believed to have transferred drones, components or designs only to its proxies and allies in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and the Gaza Strip. The presence of Iranian-manufactured drones has also been reported in Sudan, while the Venezuelan authorities appear to have shown some interest in the Mohajer-6 drone.
Whether Ethiopia and Iran have struck any military deals remains to be seen. However, in July and August of this year, open source flight trackers flagged the presence of Iranian cargo aircraft at various civil and military airbases across Ethiopia. One of these aircraft was sanctioned by the US Treasury in 2020 for alleged links to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The content of these flights is unknown.
Armed and Dangerous?
As there are ongoing concerns over civilian casualties from airstrikes in Ethiopia, it’s important to check if the Mohajer-6 is armed.
Imagery from Iran, as well as media reports, indicate that the Mohajer-6 can indeed be armed with various missiles and bombs. One of these is the Qaem air-t0-surface missile.
The photographs analysed indicate that the drone model seen at Semara has various points where weapons can be equipped. One of these drones appears to be armed with a missile.
In recent weeks, further claims about Iranian-made missiles in Ethiopia have been aired online.
On August 13, one analyst alleged a match between missile remnants in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region and the Qaem missile. Bellingcat was unable to independently verify the accuracy of his comparison.
Finally, debris recovered from an alleged dronestrike conducted in Tigray matches the reverse conical part at the rear of Iran’s Qaem smart munitions known to be used on the Mohajer-6.
What can be said on the basis of satellite imagery and photos posted on social media is that two drones were based at Semara Airport. An analysis of the shape and measurements of these drones, as well as the footage from the drone feed, provides a strong indication that these are drones consistent with the Iranian Mohajer-6, seemingly armed with air-to-ground missiles. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that higher quality imagery would be needed to state anything conclusively.