I spent the last week of February teaching Old Testament at the newly-formed Trinity Fellowship Pastors College in Addis Ababa. Ethiopia is by far the oldest nation I’ve visited, one of the few Old Testament nations still on the map. Its existence is a theological fact, testimony to the reliability of God’s promises.
According to the “primeval history” of Genesis, descendants of Cush settled the area that is now Ethiopia and Sudan soon after the flood. The Da’amat Empire was established in the tenth century B.C. by Menilek I, reputedly the son of Solomon and Makeda, queen of Sheba. According to the Kebre Negast (“The Glory of the Kings”), which was compiled in the fourteenth century A.D., Queen Makeda made a pilgrimage to Israel to learn statecraft from Solomon, who seduced her. Makeda conceived and went home to give birth to her son. As a boy, Menilek visited his father in Jerusalem, where Solomon anointed him as king of Ethiopia. As retribution for the humiliation of his mother, Menilek stole the Ark of the Covenant and levitated it across the Red Sea to Ethiopia, where it purportedly remains to this day. It’s a persistent national myth. Until Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown in 1974, Ethiopian leaders claimed to be sons of Solomon, lions descended from the Lion of Judah.
There’s nothing of this legend in Scripture. To ancient Israelites, Ethiopia wasn’t an ally but an uncanny and terrifying threat. Cush’s son Nimrod founded Nineveh and Babylon (Gen. 10:8–12), cities that later conquered Israel. Aaron and Miriam objected when Moses took a Cushite wife (Num. 12:1). During the reign of King Asa, Zerah the Cushite came over the southern horizon to invade Judah with hundreds of chariots and a million-man army (2 Chron. 14).
Against this background, the heroism of Ebed-Melech is all the more notable (Jer. 38). Ebed-Melech was a Cushite eunuch who served in the court of King Zedekiah during the last days of Judah. The prophet Jeremiah counsels Zedekiah to surrender to Babylon. Enraged by this message, Jerusalem’s officials force Zedekiah to approve their plan to put the traitorous prophet to death. Like Joseph, Jeremiah is tossed into a muddy cistern without water, left to die of thirst.
Ebed-Melech bursts onto the scene as an unexpected deliverer. As the wonderfully-named Deusdedit Musinguzi points out in a monograph on the passage, Ebed-Melech is a model of compassion, justice, and courage. Though a foreigner, he charges Jerusalem’s leaders with “evil” in open court, and persuades the king to let him pull Jeremiah up from the pit. Ebed-Melech’s name, “Servant of the King,” indicates he’s Zedekiah’s servant, but he proves himself loyal to the King. As a Gentile deliverer, he foreshadows Nebuchadnezzar and Cyrus. He literally rescues Jeremiah from death, raising him from beneath the earth, a figure of the Spirit who brings a greater Prophet from the grave. In every way, Ebed-Melech is the antithesis of the corrupt Jewish courtiers, a Gentile without Torah who keeps the Torah written on his heart (Rom. 2:14–15).
Ebed-Melech is firstfruits of a great harvest from the land of Cush. According to Orthodox tradition, Christianity came to the country in the late third century through two shipwrecked Syrian boys, the brothers Aedisius and Frumentius, who were brought to the court of the Axum emperor. Through their faithful service, the boys rose to high positions, and their witness convinced the emperor to become a Christian. In 305, the emperor’s successor sent Frumentius to Alexandria to ask the patriarch—none other than Athanasius—to send a bishop to Axum to promote evangelism and church construction. Athanasius ordained Frumentius, who returned to baptize Emperor Ezana, who made Christianity the official religion of his empire. Ethiopia is among the oldest of Christian nations.
In Acts, Luke tells us that Christianity arrived in Ethiopia already in the early first century. The first known Gentile to be baptized was another Ethiopian eunuch, a latter-day Ebed-Melech, who meets Philip in a Spirit-arranged encounter on the road from Jerusalem to Gaza (Acts 8). Though “cut off” like the Suffering Servant in the text he reads, the Ethiopian eunuch becomes fruitful, with a place in the house of his God (Isa. 56:1–8; Deut. 23:1–5).
Already in the old covenant, when the very name “Cush” could send chills down Israelite spines, the Lord promised he would one day adopt Ethiopia as a “home-born” son and a child of Zion (Ps. 87:4). One day, he promised, Cush would bring tribute to Jerusalem (Isa. 45:14). These promises form the story arc of Ethiopia’s long history. Every time you see Ethiopia is still on the map, you’re seeing real-world proof of the faithfulness of God.
👉 Peter J. Leithart is President of Theopolis Institute.
💭 Abune Mathias is an Ethiopian patriarch of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church since 2013. His full title is “His Holiness Abune Mathias I, Sixth Patriarch and Catholicos of Ethiopia, Archbishop of Axum and Ichege of the See of Saint Taklehaimanot”.
Competing regional powers have quietly backed Abiy Ahmed in Ethiopia’s deadly conflict
👉 From The New Arab
The war that started in November 2020 as a conflict between the Ethiopian Federal Government and the Tigray Regional Government has turned the country into an arena where many regional and international powers are active.
Like a Pandora’s box suddenly opened, the conflict has borne many geopolitical surprises, but one of its most important ironies is the reported use of drones and weapons supplied by competing powers in the Middle East, who seem to have agreed on their support for Ethiopia’s government.
U A E, the first player
The United Arab Emirates (U A E) has intervened in the Ethiopian war since it began, with leaders from the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) accusing Abu Dhabi of targeting Tigray an forces in November 2020 with drones stationed at its Assab military base in Eritrea.
In the wake of the Ethiopian withdrawal in the face of the advancing Tigray an forces in the summer of 2021, an Emirati air bridge supporting the government was monitored. This comprised more than 90 flights between the two countries in the period between September and November 2021.
Satellite images identified Emirati drones at Harar Meda Airport in Ethiopia and at a military base in Deirdawa in the east of the country.
The U A E’s intervention was an extension of its strategy to build an allied political and security system across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, most notably following Who Tea gains around Bab al-Mandab at the beginning of Yemen’s conflict.
Abiy Ahmed’s election as Ethiopia’s prime minister in 2018 further accelerated an alliance between Addis Ababa and Abu Dhabi.
That same year, the U A E-sponsored Eritrean-Ethiopia peace agreement pledged to support the Ethiopian treasury with three billion dollars, and made huge investments in various sectors.
From this perspective, the possibility of the Tigray ans seizing power in Addis Ababa was a threat to these political arrangements, and Emirati investments, especially since the TPLF view Abu Dhabi with hostility after its role in their first defeat in November 2020.
Turkish drones in the Habesha sky.
The visit of the Ethiopian prime minister to Ankara in August 2021 represented a turning point in the relationship between the two countries, which had become estranged in parallel with the development of Ethiopian ties with the U A E-Saudi axis.
During the visit, a package of agreements was signed that included “military cooperation”. Indeed, according to the Turkish Defence Industries Corporation, the value of Turkish military exports to Ethiopia increased from just $234,000 in 2020 to nearly $95 million in 2021.
Although in July 2021 the Turkish embassy in Addis Ababa denied that it had supplied drones to Addis Ababa, reports alleged the participation of Bayraktar TB2 drones in military operations in Ethiopia’s conflict after Ahmed’s visit to Ankara, which were not denied by either side this time.
This development is an extension of the Turkish approach in the region described by Jason Moseley, a Research Associate at the African Studies Centre at Oxford University. “Turkey has adopted an interventionist attitude in the regional crisis, with the consequent rebalancing between soft and hard power in favor of the latter,” he wrote last year.
In fact, Turkey saw drone support for the Ethiopian government as a strategic gain, bolstering its reputation in the African military and security market after it had proven its success in an African war arena, with growing demand for this type of weapon.
Ankara’s participation also indicates that Turkish construction companies could make a significant contribution to the reconstruction of infrastructure in the areas destroyed by the war
Preventing Ethiopia from sliding into a civil war protects Ankara’s large investments inside the country and ensures that the ensuing chaos does not spread into neighbouring Somalia, the most important centre of Turkish influence in the African continent.
Additionally, Turkish support for the Ethiopian government appears to be a strategic necessity due to Ankara’s fears of the Tigray ans, who Ethiopia has accused of being supported by Egypt.
In this sense, Ankara’s ties with Ethiopia are related to the exchange of support between the two countries, which is taking place in the context of their conflict with Egypt.
Iran seeks an opportunity
In a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, on 7 December 2021, TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael accused Iran, along with the UAE and Turkey, of providing the Ethiopian army with weapons, including drones.
Prior to that, the US government had accused Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) of providing drones to Ethiopia, and on 29 October 2021, sanctions were issued by the US Treasury Department.
According to investigative websites, Iranian drones have been seen in Ethiopia and 15 flights from two airlines linked to the IRGC have been monitored from Iran to the Harar Meda military base in Ethiopia.
Both the Iranian and Ethiopian governments have not yet commented on these reports.
The sharp dispute between Ethiopia and the United States over the war in Tigray, and Washington’s continuous pressure on Ahmed’s government, who has framed the conflict as a colonial attack on Ethiopia’s unity, has apparently brought Tehran and Addis Ababa closer.
Iran sees the Ethiopian PM’s need for military equipment as an opportunity to expand its strategic presence in a country that is historically an ally of the United States and Israel.
This level of Iranian engagement demonstrates the importance of the Ethiopian arena for Tehran, and indicates Iran’s desire to enter the burgeoning military and security market in Africa.
However, the most important prize for Tehran is a return to Ethiopia, which is situated close to Yemen, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Horn of Africa, after losing its influence in recent years with allies Eritrea and Sudan following Emirati-Saudi pressure, and the fall of Omar al-Bashir’s regime in Khartoum after popular protests.
Ultimately, all three powers are trying to exploit a moment of Ethiopian weakness to create or consolidate their influence.
The weight and extent of their involvement are best indicated, perhaps, by consultations the US envoy to the Horn of Africa, which has historical influence in Ethiopia, has been having with Middle Eastern capitals to try to find a solution to the Ethiopian crisis.
If Ethiopia is indeed operating Iranian-made armed drones, that would represent a significant addition to the list of beneficiaries from Teheran’s burgeoning drone programme. So far, Iran is believed to have transferred drones, components or designs only to its proxies and allies in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and the Gaza Strip. The presence of Iranian-manufactured drones has also been reported in Sudan, while the Venezuelan authorities appear to have shown some interest in the Mohajer-6 drone.
Whether Ethiopia and Iran have struck any military deals remains to be seen. However, in July and August of this year, open source flight trackers flagged the presence of Iranian cargo aircraft at various civil and military airbases across Ethiopia. One of these aircraft was sanctioned by the US Treasury in 2020 for alleged links to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The content of these flights is unknown.
Armed and Dangerous?
As there are ongoing concerns over civilian casualties from airstrikes in Ethiopia, it’s important to check if the Mohajer-6 is armed.
Imagery from Iran, as well as media reports, indicate that the Mohajer-6 can indeed be armed with various missiles and bombs. One of these is the Qaem air-t0-surface missile.
The photographs analysed indicate that the drone model seen at Semara has various points where weapons can be equipped. One of these drones appears to be armed with a missile.
In recent weeks, further claims about Iranian-made missiles in Ethiopia have been aired online.
On August 13, one analyst alleged a match between missile remnants in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region and the Qaem missile. Bellingcat was unable to independently verify the accuracy of his comparison.
Finally, debris recovered from an alleged dronestrike conducted in Tigray matches the reverse conical part at the rear of Iran’s Qaem smart munitions known to be used on the Mohajer-6.
What can be said on the basis of satellite imagery and photos posted on social media is that two drones were based at Semara Airport. An analysis of the shape and measurements of these drones, as well as the footage from the drone feed, provides a strong indication that these are drones consistent with the Iranian Mohajer-6, seemingly armed with air-to-ground missiles. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that higher quality imagery would be needed to state anything conclusively.
End Time Revelation: The end times are unfolding before our very eyes.The Ezekiel 38/Psalm 83 Prophecies: Russia, Iran and Muslim Nations against spiritual Israel which is Christianity – Orthodox Christianity.
A sudden violent outbreak of civil war in Ethiopia’s northern Tieggrai region has thrown the nation into turmoil. After years of uneasy peace with its northern neighbour, Ethiopia suddenly finds itself at war with an unexpected foe equipped with the very same armament it stockpiled in preparation for a conventional war with Eritrea. With the Tieggrai People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) making steady gains and government forces seemingly unable to stem the tide, the country is now frantically looking for anything to change its fortunes. In so doing, it has found support in more than one unlikely ally of opportunity. Most recently, it appears Ethiopia has managed to secure a hasty contract with Iran for the delivery of a number of Mohajer-6 unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs).
The apparent delivery of Iranian UCAVs to Ethiopia is highly notable, as the country also maintains a close relationship with Israel and is a frequent importer of Israeli armament and other military services such as training. In fact, Ethiopia’s inventory of unmanned aerial vehicles previously consisted almost entirely of Israeli systems like the Aerostar UAS and WanderB mini-UAS. [1] The current service status of these UAVs is unclear however, and the fact that none of these can be armed likely caused Ethiopia to look for other sources for the acquisitions of UCAVs. Contrary to popular expectations, this source appears to have been Iran rather than Turkey or China.
After seemingly having arrived at Ethiopia’s Semara airport in north-eastern Ethiopia on the 1st of August, the drones’ Ground Control Station (GCS) was then pictured as prime minister Abby Ahmed visited the base not more than two days later. [2] [3] Satellite imagery revealed that at least two UAVs and an associated GCS were delivered, potentially for evaluation before making a larger purchase. [4] Alternatively, the small numbers seen so far could be the result of the short notice on which the delivery has taken place and the relatively small numbers of Mohajer-6 UAVs readily available. Of course, the possibility remains that more UAVs have already been delivered, but that they have simply been distributed over several airbases.
Identification of the UAVs in question posed something of a challenge. Though initial reports suggested the Chinese Harrier Hawk II Air Sniper (Yaoying II) or the Wing Loong II, potentially the same examples that have been deployed in neighbouring Eritrea by the UAE, the dimensions and distinctive shape of the drone on satellite imagery significantly narrowed the field and decisively eliminated this possibility. Complicating matters however, is the fact that no usable ground imagery is as of yet available, and the market of possible providers has become wide and diverse. Though the satellite imagery confirms the Mohajer-6 to be a very likely candidate, the identifying factor thus became the associated GCS, which was imaged more clearly.
Externally, the vehicle forms a clear (if not exact, presumably due to iterative improvements) match to other Iranian GCS both in its layout and its antenna set. Its mobility stems from a distinctively coloured Mercedes-Benz truck, staple of the Iranian military, and two doors each leading to their own separate control rooms are also a familiar sight. Externally, the distinctive white antenna featured on all Iranian GCS is perhaps the most significant point of recognition, with the communications dish apparently of a new type.
Inside, the Iranian origin of the vehicle becomes even more obvious. One screen appears to show the view from one of the drone’s FLIR cameras, and the layout and precise display of the information is nearly identical to that known from modern Iranian UAVs. Two indicators showing the orientation of the vehicle are a particularly unmistakable match.
What is more, LCD screens are placed in control pannels that feature the same buttons and dials known from Iranian footage of the Mohajer-6’s GCS. Though the computer screens might seem somewhat different because of their thick housing in the image below, other Iranian GCS in fact feature that very same housing. Even the rather stunning fact that the computers appear to run Windows 7 is a clue pointing in the direction of Iran, which is known have similarly used Windows XP in the Mohajer-4’s GCS computers.
Though the clear parallels with Iranian technology rule out various countries that have been suggested as suppliers, one might note that some Iranian drone technology was developed from Chinese drones, thus leaving the Chinese as a possibility. While many of the facts (including the desert camoed Mercedes truck) point in another direction, perhaps the most decisive reasons why this option is eliminated are because from what is known of Chinese GCS they are actually arranged quite differently, and in fact no Chinese drone matches both the dimensions and shape of the satellite imagery of the UAVs in question.
_______
_______
______
Addis Ethiopia Weblog 